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As a preliminary comment, the ongoing growth of legal challenges and 
activity in the oil and gas industry has led to a significant increase in the 
number of new legal developments occurring each year. In view of space 
limitations, the state updates included in this report are not exhaustive.  
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I. Alaska 
A. Legislative Developments 
The Alaska State Legislature enacted H.B. 111,
1
 which builds on the 
passage of H.B. 247 in 2016. Among other things, this new legislation 
phases out cashable exploration tax credits to oil and gas companies 
operating in Alaska. It also retroactively ends cash payments from the State 
of Alaska to oil companies starting July 1, 2017, changes the interest rate 
on production taxes, allows oil companies to carry forward losses for either 
10 or 7 years, and limits the time companies can hold deductions at full 
value. The legislation took effect on January 1, 2018. 
B. Judicial Developments 
In In re Aurora Gas, LLC, a buyer sought approval from the Alaska Oil 
and Gas Conservation Committee (AOGCC) to purchase several of a 
bankruptcy debtor’s oil and gas well leases. The AOGCC conditioned 
approval of the transfer on the buyer assuming the debtor’s obligations to 
plug and abandon certain gas wells which were not being purchased. The 
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Alaska held that, by 
conditioning the approval of the lease sale upon the buyer’s assumption of 
the debtor’s obligations to plug and abandon wells, the AOGCC violated 
both the bankruptcy code’s automatic stay and its prohibition against 
discriminatory treatment of bankruptcy debtors. The court struck down the 
AOGCC decision.
2
 
C. Administrative Developments 
In April of 2017, President Trump signed an Executive Order
3
 aimed at 
expanding offshore drilling in the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans and assessing 
whether energy exploration can take place in marine sanctuaries in the 
Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. These lands were made eligible for oil and gas 
leasing only four months after the prior administration issued both a 
Presidential Memorandum
4
 withdrawing 125 million acres of the Arctic 
Ocean (and its estimated 27 billion barrels of oil) from disposition by 
                                                                                                                 
 1. 2017 Alaska Adv. Legis. Serv. 3, 2017 Alaska HB 111. 
 2. 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3278 (D. Alaska Sept. 26, 2017). 
 3. Exec. Order No. 13,795, 82 FR 20815 (Apr. 28, 2017). 
 4. Memorandum from President Barack Obama to the Secretary of the Interior (Dec. 
20, 2016) (available through the Obama White House Archives) https://obamawhitehouse. 
archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/20/presidential-memorandum-withdrawal-certain-
portions-united-states-arctic. 
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leasing for an indefinite period and an Executive Order
5
 creating the 
Northern Bering Sea Climate Resilience Area and withdrawing 112,300 
square miles in Norton Sound, Alaska and near St. Lawrence Island, Alaska 
from future oil and gas leasing.  
In May of 2017, the Secretary of the Interior signed a secretarial order 
requiring, among other things, a review of the Obama Administration’s plan 
for managing the National Petroleum Reserve – Alaska (NPR-A). The order 
is intended to revitalize energy production in the NPR-A and to update 
resource assessments for portions of Alaska’s North Slope, including part 
of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR). 
In December of 2017, President Trump signed into law the national Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017. The bill opens a portion of ANWR to oil 
drilling and other energy development which had been closed to exploration 
for over 40 years, and requires the federal government to hold two lease 
sales within seven years. 
II. Arkansas 
A. Legislative Developments 
Act No. 514 of 2017
6
 changed a portion of Arkansas’ procedure for 
collection of delinquent ad valorem taxes on mineral interests. Under prior 
law, each county collector was required to publish a list of delinquencies in 
a legal newspaper as a prerequisite of the forfeiture process. Act No. 514 
removed that requirement with respect to tax-delinquent severed mineral 
interests, substituting the posting of notice of delinquencies as to those 
interests on a web site to be created and maintained by the Association of 
Arkansas Counties. The collector is now merely required to publish a legal 
notice referring mineral taxpayers to that website. It appears likely that this 
procedural change will be challenged as providing insufficient due process 
prior to forfeiture of a property right.
7
 
  
                                                                                                                 
 5. Executive Order, Northern Bearing Sea Climate Resilience (Dec. 9, 2016) (available 
at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/09/executive-order-
northern-bering-sea-climate-resilience). 
 6. Amending ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-23-204. 
 7. See Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 126 S. Ct. 1708, 164 L.Ed.2d 415. 
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B. Judicial Developments 
In JS Interests, Inc. v. Hafner
8
 the court twice interpreted the parties’ 
1982 A.A.P.L. Form 610 Operating Agreement to require a unit’s operator 
to pay overriding royalties to parties burdening a non-operating owner who 
was non-consent in the wells in question. Such interests appear to be 
“subsequently created interests” under the agreement’s Article III.D and 
would thus be required to be borne by the party whom the interests 
burdened, regardless of its non-consent status. However, the court held that 
since the assignments creating the overriding royalties had been recorded 
prior to execution of the operating agreement, they were thus disclosed in 
writing to all parties, causing them to then burden the consenting parties 
who had acquired the non-consenting interest. The court first so held in an 
order denying the operator’s motion to dismiss and again denying its 
summary judgment motion. The second of those opinions was subsequently 
withdrawn by the court pursuant to a settlement agreement which 
terminated the litigation.
9
 The court’s conclusion is highly questionable 
and, if correct, effectively guts the agreement’s Article III.D, since virtually 
all assignments of overriding royalty interests are recorded, long before 
execution of the operating agreement. 
Lipsey v. SEECO, Inc.
10
 was a putative federal class action seeking to 
certify a class of royalty owners who allegedly suffered damages due to 
belated post-period price adjustments correcting BTU mismeasurements at 
the wellhead. Plaintiffs offered a wide array of theories why they should be 
permitted to pursue such claims. However, in a detailed opinion, the district 
court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all such claims and 
denied plaintiffs leave to amend holding that no amended complaint could 
survive a similar summary judgment motion. 
In Ouachita Watch League v. United States Forest Service
11
 the federal 
appeals court dismissed an appeal prosecuted by the plaintiff society and 
several individuals challenging the Forest Service’s resource management 
plan which permitted oil and gas drilling within portions of the Ozark 
National Forest. The district court had entered summary judgment for the 
Forest Service. However, rather than dealing with the district court’s ruling, 
                                                                                                                 
 8. 2017 WL 5653873 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 10, 2017); 2017 WL 3612857 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 
22, 2017). 
 9. 2017 WL 6459566 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 27, 2017). 
 10. 2017 WL 2662977 (E.D. Ark. June 20, 2017). 
 11. 858 F.3d 539 (8th Cir. 2017) 
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the appeals court dismissed the appeal, holding that the society lacked 
standing to challenge the Forest Service’s management plan. 
In Hill v. Southwestern Energy Company
12
 the federal appeals court 
reversed a district court’s ruling granting summary judgment to 
Southwestern. Plaintiffs had sued, alleging underground trespass, claiming 
that Southwestern’s hydraulic fracturing of wells caused waste material to 
encroach beneath their unleased tracts. A skeptical Court of Appeals held 
that there was possible evidence upon which a jury could find that trespass 
occurred, thus precluding summary judgment. 
Talley v. Peedin
13
 involved a complex dispute between the children of 
the former wife of a mineral owner and the mineral owner’s widow. While 
married to the appellants’ mother, Veta Poff Moon, Dr. Nathan Poff, Sr. 
acquired, in his name alone, the surface and fractional mineral interest 
within approximately 300 acres in the heart of the Fayetteville Shale area. 
Dr. Poff later conveyed that land by warranty deed which Veta joined, 
purporting to reserve to the Grantors one-half of all oil, gas and minerals 
rights which they own. Appellants contended that the above reservation 
language vested Veta with a fee interest in the reserved minerals. In 
affirming the trial court’s ruling favoring Dr. Poff’s widow, Carolyn 
Peedin, the appeals court avoided holding whether the purported reservation 
in favor of Veta was a void stranger reservation, and whether Arkansas 
recognizes the spousal exception to the rule that a reservation in favor of a 
stranger is void.
14
 The court instead held that the above language only 
reserved minerals “owned” by the grantors and that Veta owned only an 
inchoate dower interest at the time of the reservation. 
Duvall v. Carr-Pool
15
 came about through a complex set of facts. Here is 
the sequence of deeds at issue: (1) Hawkins and wife deeded to Cargile, 
reserving all oil, gas and other minerals. (2) Cargile deeded the surface back 
to Hawkins. That deed stated that all oil, gas and other minerals were 
reserved by Cargile, but Cargile never owned any minerals in the first 
place, since they were reserved by Hawkins and wife in deed 1. (3) 
Hawkins deeded to Duvall, predecessor to the Plaintiff, Carr-Pool. That 
deed stated that it was understood that all oil, gas, and minerals in or under 
or that may be produced from said land have been previously reserved or 
conveyed. (4) After numerous conveyances within the Hawkins family, any 
                                                                                                                 
 12. 858 F.3d 481 (8th Cir. 2017) 
 13. 2017 Ark. App. 80, 515 S.W.3d 611.  
 14. An issue discussed but left undecided by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Haynes v. 
Metcalf, 759 S.W.2d 542 (Ark. 1988). 
 15. 2016 Ark. App. 466, 509 S.W.3d 661. 
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interest which was effectively reserved by Hawkins passed to Carr-Pool. 
The court of appeals held that Carr-Pool owned a disputed mineral interest 
because the above quoted language was an effective mineral reservation. 
The court found that there are no magic words needed for a mineral 
reservation to become effective. Its result was reached by simply construing 
the “four corners” of the instrument. However, this writer suggests that 
perhaps a better reason for the same result could have been that the 
language was ambiguous, thus permitting inquiry into the parties’ 
subjective intent. Facts recited by the appeals court indicated both sides had 
previously behaved consistent with the court’s interpretation. 
III. California 
A. Legislative Developments 
The California Legislature made a number of amendments in 2017 to the 
California Public Resources Code regarding the regulation of oil and gas 
operations by the Division of Gas and Geothermal Resources of the 
California Department of Conservation (DOGGR). Senate Bill No. 724
16
 
extended the period to commence well operations after DOGGR approval 
from one to two years.
17
 The bill also amended the idle well requirements 
under Public Resources Code section 3206. Public Resources section 3237, 
which had previously had only specifically authorized DOGGR to order the 
plugging and abandonment “deserted wells,” was amended to authorize 
DOGGR to also order the decommissioning of a “production facility.” 18 
Public Resources section 3237 was further amended to allow an 
abandonment or decommissioning order to issue whether or not any 
damage is occurring or threatened by reason of that deserted well or 
production facility. The bill also increased funding for DOGGR to abandon 
“idle-deserted” and “hazardous wells”19 and directed DOGGR to provide a 
report on such wells to the Legislature.  
                                                                                                                 
 16. Senate Bill No. 724; Stats. 2017, Chapter 652. https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/ 
faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB724 
 17. CALIFORNIA PUB. RESOURCES CODE, § 3203(a). 
 18. “Production facility” is defined in CALIFORNIA PUB. RESOURCES CODE, § 3010 as 
“any equipment attendant to oil and gas production or injection operations including, but not 
limited to, tanks, flowlines, headers, gathering lines, wellheads, heater treaters, pumps, 
valves, compressors, injection equipment, and pipelines that are not under the jurisdiction of 
the State Fire Marshal pursuant to Section 51010 of the Government Code.” 
 19. CALIFORNIA PUB. RESOURCES CODE, § 3258. 
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Public Resources Code section 3100 was amended by Senate Bill No. 
809
20
 to give the Director of the Department of Conservation and 
DOGGR’s Supervisor the authority to redefine DOGGR's districts as 
needed to ensure efficient administration after soliciting public input. The 
bill also amended Public Resources Code section 3008 to clarify that an 
“idle well” does not include an “active observation well”. 
The California State Water Resources Control Board and the Regional 
Water Quality Control Boards were authorized by new Water Code section 
13267.5 to require an operator or its supplier to furnish information relating 
to all chemicals in discharged wastewater when one of the board conducts a 
water quality investigation regarding the discharge of wastewater produced 
from an oil or gas field.
21
 
Section 38592.5 was added to the Health and Safety Code
22
, to require 
the California Air Resources Board in its implementation of the California 
Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 to update its scoping plan to 
achieve the greenhouse gas emissions reductions to designate a market-
based compliance mechanism as the rule for petroleum refineries and oil 
and gas production facilities. 
B. Judicial Developments 
In Southern California Gas Co. v. Superior Court,
23
 the court held that 
the operator of a natural gas storage facility did not owe a duty to prevent 
economic losses to local businesses based on alleged negligent conduct 
related to the leak of natural gas the facility. The ruling reinforces 
California’s “economic loss rule,” which bars plaintiffs from recovering 
pure economic losses under a negligence theory without personal injury, 
property damage or a special relationship. Although the decision may not 
affect claims for actual personal injuries or physical damage to property 
directly resulting from a leak at a gas storage facility or other oil and gas 
production, transportation or storage facilities, the court’s affirmation of the 
bar on the recovery of solely economic damages may limit the scope of 
potential negligence claims by persons and businesses whose only injury 
                                                                                                                 
 20. Senate Bill No. 809, Stats. 2017, Chapter 521. https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/ 
faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB809 
 21. Assembly Bill No. 1328, Stats. 2017, Chapter 758. https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/ 
faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB1328 
 22. Assembly Bill No. 398; Stats. 2017, Chapter 135. https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/ 
faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB398 
 23. __Cal.App.5th __; __ Cal.Rptr.3d___; 2017 WL 6398546 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 
2017). 
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resulting from a leak or spill was economic, such as lost revenues or a 
decrease in property value.  
The court in Association of Irritated Residents v. Department of 
Conservation,
24
 reversed the sustaining of a demurrer on res judicata 
grounds in a lawsuit filed by environmental groups challenging the 
challenging DOGGR’s issuance of drilling permits for new wells on the 
basis of a categorical exemption or negative declarations under the 
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA),
25
 since the prior judgment 
of dismissal was not based on the merits, but on mootness and un-ripeness. 
The district court in State of California v. United States Bureau of Land 
Management,
26
 held that the Bureau of Land Management violated the 
federal Administrative Procedures Act
27
 when, as part of the Department of 
Interior’s implementation28 of the President Trump’s March 28, 2017 
Executive Order No. 13783,
29
 the BLM postponed the compliance dates for 
certain sections of the Bureau’s Waste Prevention, Production Subject to 
Royalties, and Resource Conservation Rule relating to the venting, flaring, 
and royalty-free use of gas, after the rule’s effective date had already 
passed.
30
 
The court in Committee to Protect our Agricultural Water v. Occidental 
Oil And Gas Corporation
31
 dismissed a complaint alleging that large 
California oil and production companies had conspired with Governor 
Edmund G. Brown, Kern County and DOGGR to “illegally increase oil 
production and maximize profits and tax revenue by allowing oil companies 
to inject salt water into fresh water in violation of the SDWA.” 32 The court 
concluded that the claims against the government official-defendants were 
barred by the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, that the 
plaintiffs did not have standing to assert their RICO claims and that the 
plaintiffs failed to properly allege either a RICO enterprise or conspiracy or 
a pattern of racketeering activity under RICO or federal civil rights claims.   
                                                                                                                 
 24. 11 Cal.App.5th 1202; 218 Cal.Rptr.3d 517 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017). 
 25. CALIFORNIA PUB. RESOURCES CODE, § 21000 et seq. 
 26. 277 F.Supp.3d 1106; 2017 WL 4416409 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
 27. 5 USC §§ 551, et seq.  
 28. Secretarial Order No. 3349. https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/so_ 
3349_-american_energy_independence.pdf. 
 29. 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (March 28, 2017). 
 30. 82 Fed. Reg. 27,430-01 (June 15, 2017) (“Waste Prevention, Production Subject to 
Royalties, and Resource Conservation; Postponement of Certain Compliance Dates.”) 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-06-15/pdf/2017-12325.pdf. 
 31. 235 F.Supp.3d 1132 (E.D. Cal. 2017). 
 32. Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). 
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C. Administrative Developments 
Although not completed in 2017, DOGGR pursued a number of 
substantial rulemaking initiatives, including updating its Idle Wells 
Regulations
33
, as required by AB 2729,
34
 its gas pipeline regulations,
35
 as 
required by Assembly Bill No. 1420.
36
 DOGGR’s most significant current 
effort is its permanent rulemaking to modify its regulations implementing 
the Division's Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program
37
 to cover not 
only water injection and disposal wells, but also steam injection wells, 
which are essential for the production of the heavy crude oil produced in 
the Central Valley. In response to the gas leak at the 2015 Aliso Canyon 
gas storage facility, DOGGR adopted emergency regulations in 2016 
requiring that gas storage facilities in California meet new safety and 
reliability measures. DOGGR is developing permanent regulations to build 
on the emergency regulations.
38
 
IV. Colorado  
A. Judicial Developments 
Martinez v. Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation Commission
39
 potentially 
could change the focus of the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation 
Commission (COGCC). In that case, the court rejected the COGCC’s 
assertion that its role under Colorado’s Oil and Gas Conservation Act40 is to 
balance oil and gas development with other public interests such as public 
health, safety and welfare. In 2013, members of Earth Guardians petitioned 
for a rulemaking, proposing that the COGCC 
not issue any permits for the drilling of a well for oil and gas 
unless the best available science demonstrates, and an 
independent, third party organization confirms, that drilling can 
occur in a manner that does not cumulatively, with other actions, 
impair Colorado’s atmosphere, water, wildlife, and land 
                                                                                                                 
 33. http://www.conservation.ca.gov/dog/general_information/Pages/IdleWells.aspx 
 34. Stats. 2016, Chapter 272. https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml 
?bill_id=201520160AB2729 
 35. http://www.conservation.ca.gov/dog/general_information/Pages/Pipelines.aspx 
 36. Stats. 2015, Chapter 601 https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml 
?bill_id=201520160AB1420 
 37. http://www.conservation.ca.gov/dog/general_information/Pages/UICupdate.aspx 
 38. http://www.conservation.ca.gov/dog/general_information/Pages/UGSRules.aspx 
 39. No. 16CA0564, 2017 WL 1089556 (Colo. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2017). 
 40. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 34-60-101, et seq. 
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resources, does not adversely impact human health and does not 
contribute to climate change.
41
 
After receiving written comments and holding a hearing, the COGCC 
denied the petition, finding that the proposed rule mandated action that was 
beyond the limited statutory authority delegated to the COGCC in the Act. 
Petitioners appealed to district court, which affirmed the COGCC’s denial 
of the petition. The appellate court reversed in a split 2-1 decision. The 
court cited language in the Act stating that it is in the public interest 
to“[f]oster the responsible, balanced development, production, and 
utilization of … oil and gas … in a manner consistent with protection of 
public health, safety, and welfare, including protection of the environment 
and wildlife resources.”42 Focusing on the phrase “in a manner consistent 
with” and modifications to the Act over time, the court concluded that the 
Act does not establish a test under which the COGCC is to balance oil and 
gas production with other public interests, but instead sets out a condition 
that must be fulfilled. The court held that “the clear language of the Act … 
mandates that the development of oil and gas in Colorado be regulated 
subject to the protection of public health, safety and welfare, including 
protection of the environment and wildlife resources.”43 The Colorado 
Attorney General appealed this decision to the Colorado Supreme Court 
over the objection of Colorado’s governor. As of the date of this writing, 
the court has not determined whether to accept certiorari. 
Bill Barrett Corporation v. YMC Royalty Company, LP
44
 involved a suit 
by the operator to recover a non-operator’s share of the cost of drilling two 
oil and gas wells in Weld County. A representative of the non-operator had 
signed AFE proposal letters electing to participate in each of the wells and 
had signed and initialed the AFEs. However, the parties had not agreed on 
the terms of, and thus had not executed, a joint operating agreement. In the 
context of cross motions for summary judgment by the parties, the federal 
district court rejected the non-operator’s claim that, absent a joint operating 
agreement, the operator can recover its drilling costs only from production 
from the wells. The court rejected the claim that AFEs cannot form a 
binding contract as a matter of law, and that the proposal letters and AFEs 
were fatally incomplete as contracts because they are silent regarding when 
the obligation to pay arises, how and when payment is to be made, and the 
                                                                                                                 
 41. Martinez, 2017 WL 1089556, at *2. 
 42. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-102(1)(a)(I). 
 43. Martinez, 2017 WL 1089556, at *7. 
 44. 301 F.Supp.3d 976 (D. Colo. Dec. 23, 2016). 
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terms of payment. Since the wells already had been drilled, the court found 
those payment terms to be “of no apparent consequence” to the lawsuit. 
In Maralex Resources, Inc. v. Jewell,
45
 the court held that the Interior 
Board of Land Appeals’ (IBLA) finding that the Federal Oil and Gas 
Management Act of 1982 (FOGRMA)
46
 authorizes Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM) representatives to conduct warrantless, unannounced 
inspections of oil wells on the plaintiffs’ fee land was not arbitrary, 
capricious or otherwise contrary to law. The fee oil and gas leases covering 
plaintiffs’ land had been committed by the lessee to a communitization 
agreement, and the IBLA had concluded that nothing in FOGRMA 
“precludes BLM … from inspecting non-Federal/non-Indian lease sites, for 
the purpose of determining whether oil or gas production from … [said] 
lands is being accurately recorded and reported … when that production is 
properly attributable to Federal or Indian lands, under … communitization 
agreements.”47 While the inspection directive in FOGRMA48 refers only to 
“lease sites on Federal or Indian lands,” the court cited the fact that 
production from any lease site subject to a communitization agreement is 
deemed to occur on each lease site within the communitization agreement. 
The court also concluded that the BLM’s access did not violate plaintiffs’ 
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizure, given the limited 
purposes for which BLM was granted access to their land.
49
 
A-W Land Co., LLC v. Anadarko E&P Company LP
50
 addressed issues 
relating to the surface use reservation in deeds to surface owners by Union 
Pacific Railroad Company. After Anadarko acquired Union Pacific’s 
reserved mineral interest and the Colorado Supreme Court decided 
McCormick v. Union Pacific Resources Co.,
51
 Anadarko discontinued 
Union Pacific’s practice of negotiating surface owner’s agreements under 
which surface owners received royalty payments on minerals extracted 
under their lands. Plaintiffs, which represented a class of surface owners 
within the Wattenberg oil field in northeastern Colorado, sued alleging that 
Anadarko’s use of the surface of their lands to access the subsurface 
minerals exceeds the scope of the surface reservation in the underlying 
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deeds, and thus constitutes trespass under Colorado law. The court ruled 
that the language “convenient or necessary” contained in the deed clause 
relating to use of the land was to be construed from the mineral owner’s 
point of view only.
52
 The court indicated that it had resolved the issues that 
are capable of resolution on a class-wide basis and dissolved the plaintiff 
class but did not grant summary judgment; thus, the various plaintiffs could 
proceed to trial on liability and damages individually. In advance of a jury 
trial involving the claims of surface owners Marvin and Mildred Bay, the 
court addressed in a separate opinion objections by the parties to anticipated 
expert testimony.
53
 The case is now on appeal to the Tenth Circuit. 
Two cases involved claims that a producer failed to comply with the 
terms of a prior settlement of a royalty class action. The dispute in EnCana 
Oil & Gas (USA), Inc. v. Miller
54
 arose out of a 2008 settlement of a royalty 
class action
55
 which, among other things, established the methodology the 
producer would use for future royalty payments and included an arbitration 
clause. After approving the settlement agreement, the district court had 
dismissed the suit with prejudice. In 2016, certain royalty owners filed a 
demand for arbitration alleging that the producer had underpaid royalties 
owed to members of the class in violation of the 2008 settlement 
agreement. The producer filed suit, asserting that the class had ceased to 
exist when the prior case was dismissed with prejudice in 2008, and that the 
settlement agreement did not authorize arbitration on a class-wide basis. 
The district court ruled for the royalty owners, and the court of appeals 
affirmed. The court determined that the class survived the 2008 dismissal, 
since compliance with the settlement order became part of the order of 
dismissal and the district court retains jurisdiction to give effect to it, and 
because the settlement agreement continues for the lives of the applicable 
leases.
56
 Analyzing the language of the settlement agreement as a whole, 
the court also concluded that the producer’s claim that the settlement 
agreement should be interpreted to require bilateral, as opposed to class-
wide, arbitration was contrary to the plain meaning of that agreement. 
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The second case, Phelps Oil & Gas, LLC v. Noble Energy, Inc.,
57
 arose 
after the producer audited DCP Midstream, LP (DCP), which provides post-
wellhead services for the producer under percentage of proceeds (POP) 
agreements. In the audit, the producer initially identified $34 million of 
potential underpayments, then entered into a settlement agreement with 
DCP that modified the terms of the POP agreements and included DCP’s 
agreement to commit $17.5 million to make improvements to its gas 
processing and transportation infrastructure. A party to a 2007 royalty class 
action settlement with the producer sued on behalf of the class claiming that 
it was entitled to royalties on the full amount claimed by the producer in the 
DCP audit. The court held that there was no basis to conclude that the 
royalty owner was entitled to a royalty on the full $34 million asserted by 
the producer in the DCP audit but not paid to it by DCP. However, the court 
refused to grant the producer’s summary judgment motion on the royalty 
owner’s breach of contract claim that related to DCP’s promise to invest 
$17.5 million in infrastructure primarily for the benefit of the producer, 
concluding that genuine issues of fact remain as to whether that is the basis 
for a payment of royalties to the royalty owner. 
In Crichton v. Augustus Energy Resources, L.L.C.,
58
 the court rejected a 
producer’s motion to dismiss a royalty class action against it on the grounds 
that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative remedies before the 
COGCC prior to filing the case. The court found that the dispute was 
contractual in nature, and cited language in the Act providing that the 
COGCC is precluding from exercising jurisdiction over any controversy 
involving bona fide dispute regarding contract interpretation.
59
 The court 
also affirmed that language in the Act stating that the COGCC must make a 
determination of whether a bona fide contract dispute exists before 
exercising jurisdiction does not require a COGCC determination that the 
dispute is contractual in nature before a dispute may be filed in district 
court.
60
 
Finally, there were two oil and gas tax cases. In Kinder Morgan Co2 Co., 
L.P. v. Montezuma County Board of Commissioners,
61
 the Colorado 
Supreme Court held that the Colorado statute authorizing retroactive 
taxation of oil and gas leaseholds when “taxable property has been omitted 
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from the assessment roll”62 allows retroactive taxation when a leaseholder 
correctly reported the volume of oil or gas sold but underreported the 
wellhead selling price of the oil or gas. In an unpublished decision in Oxy 
USA Inc. v. Mesa County Board of Commissioners,
63
 the Colorado Supreme 
Court held that the statute authorizing abatement of taxes for any 
overvaluation
64
 allows abatement even when the overvaluation is caused by 
taxpayer error. 
C. Administrative Developments 
Following a home explosion in April 2017 caused by an abandoned oil 
and gas flowline connected to an active well that killed two people and 
injured a third person, COGCC issued a notice requiring operators to 
inspect systematically their inventory of existing flowlines and verify that 
any existing flowline not in active use is abandoned.
65
 The notice also 
required operators to document the location of all existing flowlines located 
within 1000 feet of a building unit and ensure and document that those lines 
have integrity.
66
 At the request of Governor Hickenlooper, COGCC 
undertook a three-month review of oil and gas operations in Colorado after 
the home explosion. On August 22, 2017, the Governor announced seven 
policy initiatives growing out of this review.
67
 Two of these initiatives 
(strengthening COGCC’s flowline regulations and enhancing the 8-1-1 
“one call” program) are to be implemented through a COGCC rulemaking. 
COGCC is in the process of a rulemaking to implement changes to its 
flowline and safety rules. 
V. Kansas 
A. Judicial Developments 
A long-running dispute in Northern Natural Gas Company v. L.D. 
Drilling, Inc.
68
 has clarified Kansas rules relating to gas storage. This case 
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arises out of Northern Natural’s condemnation pursuant to the federal 
Natural Gas Act,
69
 of approximately 9,000 acres for its natural gas storage 
operation. The court appointed a commission to determine the 
compensation due to the owners of rights in the condemned subsurface 
area. The court directed the commission that K.S.A. 55-1210 vested the 
subsurface owners with title to gas that Northern Natural placed in storage 
beneath their land as of the time of the condemnation.
70
 The Tenth Circuit, 
in reviewing the district court’s ruling adopting the compensation report of 
the commission, reversed the decision. The Circuit Court awarded 
compensation to surface owners for Northern Natural’s gas in place beneath 
their land as of the date of the taking which was March 30, 2012, and for 
any right to produce the gas from their land after the “date of certification” 
of the area for gas storage, which was June 2, 2010. This decision is 
consistent with the holding in Union Gas Systems Inc. v. Carnahan.
71
 The 
district court did not follow the Union Gas case because the decision 
predated the enactment of K.S.A. 55-1210. The court in Union Gas noted 
that prior to the certification of an area for gas storage, the subsurface 
owners’ basic property right is the exercise of its right to capture and 
extract migrating storage gas. Once the area is certified as a gas storage 
area, the capture rights end and the gas storage condemnation statutes–as 
interpreted by the Union Gas court—do not require compensation for the 
migrating storage gas. The court confirmed the award for the acreage 
acquired as a storage area buffer zone for Northern Natural’s existing gas 
storage and also affirmed the district court’s refusal to award attorneys’ fees 
finding that the tendered statutory basis for fees did not apply. 
The case of LCL, LLC v. Falen,
72
 Falen had in June 2007 listed land for 
sale with Rice Abstract instructing that the seller would retain all mineral 
rights. The land was subject to a producing oil and gas lease. In November 
of that year, Falen entered into a contract to sell the land which provided 
that the seller would retain all mineral rights for twenty years after 
production ceases. Rice Abstract issued a title commitment to the buyer that 
did not list the excepted mineral interest. In January 2008, Rice Abstract 
drafted and filed the deed of record to complete the sale. The deed did not 
contain the mineral exception. Because Falen continued to receive royalties 
under the existing oil and gas lease, the error was not discovered 
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immediately. Falen made purported conveyances of the minerals to others 
in 2008, 2010 and 2012. In 2014, the grantee sold its interest in the land to 
LCL. A member of LCL stated that they understood the mineral rights did 
not go with the property. Rice Abstract provided title insurance and acted as 
the closing agent for the sale. When the sale was closed, there was no 
mention of the mineral interests in the deed or the title commitment. LCL 
later inquired about the minerals and Rice Abstract discovered its errors. In 
2014, LCL asserted a right to the mineral rights under its title insurance 
policy. Falen did not discover the failure to except the mineral interests in 
the 2008 conveyance until 2014. LCL sued to quiet title to the mineral 
interests. Falen counterclaimed to quiet its title to the mineral interests and 
also filed a third-party suit against Rice Abstract for negligence, breach of 
implied contract and breach of fiduciary duty. LCL and Falen reached a 
settlement. The district court found that all claims against Rice Abstract 
were barred by the statute of limitations. In a set of findings too lengthy to 
describe in this brief case summary, the court of appeals concluded that 
certain of the claims against Rice Abstract were not barred by statutes of 
limitation.  
In In re Protest of Barker
73
 the issue was whether ad valorem tax may be 
assessed on oil and gas equipment that is associated with a lease that is 
exempt from tax under Kansas’ low-production exemption. In Kansas, oil 
and gas leases are classified as personal property for the purpose of ad 
valorem tax.
74
 K.S.A. 79-201t(a) provides an exemption from ad valorem 
taxes for all oil leases, other than royalty interests therein, the average daily 
production from which is three barrels or less per producing well or five 
barrels or less per producing well which has a completion depth of 2,000 
feet or more. Kansas construes exemptions from taxation strictly against the 
taxpayer. The court of appeals found that ad valorem taxation seeks to 
value the oil and gas lease by determining the present worth of the lease’s 
future production. Therefore, the issue of first impression was whether 
equipment used in the production of oil is considered part of an “oil lease” 
for purposes of tax exemption. The court found that there is nothing in the 
statutory scheme or case law expressly stating that equipment is included in 
the definition of “oil lease” for the purposes of tax exemption. Instead, 
various statutes suggest that equipment is not included in that definition. 
The court concluded that the equipment is not considered part of an “oil 
lease” as that term is used in K.S.A. 2016, Supp. 79-201t. 
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The case of In re Estate of Bush
75
considered the effect of K.S.A. 58-
2202 which provides “every conveyance of real estate shall pass all estate 
of the grantor therein, unless the intent to pass a less estate shall expressly 
appear or be necessarily implied in the terms of the grant.” In this case, one 
daughter, Debbie, inherited eighty acres in fee from her father. In order to 
carry out her father’s wishes, Debbie conveyed forty acres to her sister, 
Judy, and also conveyed an undivided one-half interest in the oil and gas in 
the entire eighty acres while retaining a one-half interest in herself. The 
producing wells were not distributed equally throughout the eighty-acre 
tract. The intent was to allow both daughters to share equally in the 
production from the eighty acres. Debbie later gifted her interest in the land 
to Bush using a deed that conveyed the entire eighty acres but excepted the 
forty-acre tract previously conveyed to Judy. There was no mention of 
Debbie’s undivided one-half interest in the eighty acres. Bush then 
conveyed the property to himself and Debbie as joint tenants using the same 
deed language. Bush survived Debbie, however, Judy, as her sole heir, 
asserted that the one-half mineral interest in the eighty-acre tract was not 
affected by the conveyance to Bush. The district court found that once the 
one-half mineral interest had been created in the eighty-acre tract, a 
conveyance would not encompass the mineral interest unless it was 
expressly referenced in the deed. The court of appeals reversed holding that 
the settled rule in Kansas states that severed mineral interests are 
transferred with the land unless they have been specifically identified in the 
deed and excluded from the transfer. Therefore, the deeds included all of 
Debbie’s ownership in the eighty-acre tract excluding the forty acres owned 
by Judy. 
The case of Lewis v. Kansas Production Company
76
 involved a 1972 oil 
and gas lease. In 1994, the lessee, Roberts, assigned the rights below the 
then producing formation to McCann with the lessee retaining the shallow 
rights. In 2005, the lessor sued McCann, the owner of the deep rights, to 
terminate McCann’s rights to the lease. In 2009, the court gave McCann the 
option to explore the deep rights or terminate the lease. In 2010, McCann 
drilled the required well which did not produce. In 2013, the lessors filed 
the lawsuit at issue in this matter asserting a breach of the implied covenant 
to explore and develop, a claim the lease was not maintained by Roberts’ 
production and for attorneys’ fees under K.S.A. 55-201 and 55-202. Prior to 
2015, Roberts ceased producing and relinquished his leasehold interest in 
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the upper formations. At trial in 2015, the Court held that McCann had 
breached the implied covenant to develop and explore, that the lease 
terminated and that the lessors were entitled to statutory attorney fees. The 
parties had stipulated that the Deep Horizons Act
77
 applied and that 
McCann, as the holder of the deep rights, had the burden of proving 
reasonable exploration and development by a preponderance of the 
evidence. In analyzing the implied covenant to explore or develop, the court 
found that compliance could only relate to the time frame from the district 
court’s July 2009, order to the time the suit was filed in November 2013.78 
The court held that the lessee’s obligation to develop would be suspended 
since the lessor had filed suit to challenge its lease. The court was not 
impressed by the actions of McCann, the owner of the deep rights, who 
waited until demand was made by the lessors to cause the well drilled in 
2010, to be logged and analyzed by an expert. The court found that this was 
“too little, too late to satisfy the implied covenant to explore and develop as 
imposed in the Deep Horizons Act.”79 The court of appeals found that the 
district court had the discretionary authority to terminate the assigned 
portion of the lease under K.S.A. 55-226.  
In the case of Jenkins v. Chi. Pac. Corp.
80
, the court affirmed the rule 
which has existed in Kansas since approximately 1905, that when a railroad 
company acquires a strip of land for a right-of-way, it generally takes only 
an easement. This is the rule whether the strip is acquired by condemnation 
or by deed. When the railroad abandons the right-of-way, the estate reverts 
to the original landowners. This rule applies when the deed shows that the 
property was conveyed for use as right-of-way for a railroad. 
VI. Louisiana 
A. Judicial Developments 
Louisiana law defines a mineral servitude as “the right of enjoyment of 
land belonging to another for the purpose of exploring for and producing 
minerals and reducing them to possession and ownership.”81 In Smith, et al. 
v. Andrews, et al., there is an in-depth discussion about the nature of 
                                                                                                                 
 77. K.S.A. 55–223 to 55–229. 
 78. This is likely to be incorrect. The last appropriate time frame would be from the date 
the last well was drilled exploring the deep rights which was in 2010, until the suit was filed 
in November 2013. 
 79. K.S.A. 55-223. 
 80. 403 P.3d 1213 (Kan. 2017). 
 81. See LA. R.S. 31:21.  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
220 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 4 
  
 
mineral servitudes, and what kind of factual evidence will be sufficient to 
find that a mineral servitude has not prescribed for non-use.
82
 While the 
facts are somewhat complicated, the basic dispute revolved around a claim 
by the Andrews parties to be the mineral owners of the subject property in 
the wake of the Haynesville Shale boom. After a bench trial, the district 
court concluded that the testimony of Mr. Andrews was “completely 
lacking in credibility and ruled in favor of the servitude owners (the Smith 
parties)."
83
 This ruling was upheld on appeal, and the Louisiana Supreme 
Court denied review of the matter. The court explained that “Mr. Andrews 
gave several inconsistent versions of what he contended happened to 
Rogers No. 1 Well.”84 In ruling on various issues, the court confirmed that 
the servitude owners bore the burden of establishing maintenance of the 
servitude. The court concluded the servitude owners met their burden of 
proof that the servitude had been maintained. The court found the servitude 
owners met this burden by virtue of the assignee’s testimony that any 
actions he undertook on the property were done with the intent to act not 
only for himself, but also for the servitude owners. 
In Gladney v. Anglo-Dutch Energy, L.L.C.,
85
 the court examined how a 
lease royalty should be paid after the conditional allowable was granted but 
before the effective date of the Commissioner of Conservation’s unitization 
order granting such an allowable. The lease at issue provided for a 1/5 
royalty. The lessee drilled a well and then applied for the creation of a 
compulsory unit with Office of Conservation, along with a conditional 
allowable. The conditional allowable was granted on May 17, 2012. 
Pursuant to the allowable, revenue from first production, subject to the 
outcome of the unit application, was to be disbursed based upon the results 
of the unitization proceeding. The unit order was also issued “effective on 
and after October 30, 2012.”86 The Third Circuit concluded that the lessee 
was obligated to pay the 1/5 lease-basis royalty on all production, as 
opposed to paying the royalty on production from a unit-tract basis, from 
the date of first production to the effective date of the unit. The court cited 
testimony from the presiding officer of the unitization hearing who 
expressly stated that a conditional allowable does not prejudice the 
                                                                                                                 
 82. 215 So. 3d 868 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/15/17), writ denied, 220 So. 3d 749 (La. 5/19/17).  
 83. Id. at 874.  
 84. Id.  
 85. 210 So. 3d 903 (La. Ct. App. December 21, 2016), writ denied, 218 So. 3d 120 (La. 
April 13, 2017). 
 86. Id. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol4/iss2/2
2018]  Legal Developments in 2017 Affecting Oil and Gas 221 
 
 
contractual rights as between the lessor and lessee. The trial court decision 
was reversed in favor of the lessor. 
Multiple courts have recently interpreted Louisiana Revised Statutes 
30:103.1 et seq., which is a reporting statute with an accompanying penalty. 
That statutory regime creates rights and obligations as between an operator 
of a unit well and certain unleased interests included within a “force 
pooled” oil and gas unit. Specifically, in TDX Energy the court held that La. 
R.S. 30:103.1 et seq. applies only to tracts included in a unit that are not 
subject to an oil and gas lease, whether by the operator of the well or any 
other third party.
87
 However, Louisiana’s Third Circuit court of appeal in 
XXI Oil & Gas found that other working-interest owners were “unleased” 
vis-a-vis the operator of the unit well and thus, have a right to make 
demand under La. R.S. 30:103.1 et seq.
88
 Both of these decisions were the 
subject of appeal. Writ of Certiorari was denied by the Louisiana Supreme 
Court in XXI Oil & Gas.
89
 In TDX Energy, the Fifth Circuit reviewed the 
Western District’s earlier decision in light of the Louisiana Supreme 
Court’s writ denial in XXI Oil & Gas. Initially, the Fifth Circuit noted the 
absence of a controlling decision from the Supreme Court of Louisiana. 
Accordingly, the court attempted to determine how the highest court of the 
state would resolve the issue by deferring to the intermediate Louisiana 
courts. In an opinion that embraced the rationale in XXI Oil & Gas, the 
court concluded that the only logical reading of the statute’s plain language 
provides rights under La. R.S. 30:103.1 et seq. to any oil and gas interest 
owners that do not have a lease with the operator.  
In Guilbeau v. Hess Corporation,
90
 the Fifth Circuit had occasion to 
examine the subsequent purchaser doctrine in the context of an oilfield 
legacy case. The defendants conducted oil and gas operations on the 
plaintiff’s property until 1971, and the oil and gas lease at issue expired in 
1973. Subsequently, in 2007, plaintiff purchased the property at issue, and 
the sale did not contain any express assignment of the personal rights to sue 
for pre-purchase damages. Plaintiff filed suit, alleging claims of 
environmental contamination from historic oil and gas operations. In 
response, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that 
plaintiff’s claims were barred by the subsequent purchaser doctrine. The 
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court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the Louisiana Supreme Court 
decision in Eagle Pipe & Supply Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corp. and its 
progeny created any uncertainty in the law.
91
 Instead, the Fifth Circuit 
found there was a clear consensus among Louisiana appellate courts 
applying Eagle Pipe to expired mineral leases. Thus, pursuant to Eagle 
Pipe and Louisiana appellate court decisions, the subsequent purchaser 
doctrine barred plaintiff’s claims for damages related to conduct prior to the 
assignment in favor of plaintiff. 
Res nova issues relating to the interpretation of La. R.S. 30:29, 
commonly referred to as “Act 312,” in an oilfield legacy suit were 
addressed in The Sweet Lake Land and Oil Co., et al. v. Oleum Operating 
Co., L.C.,
92
 This decision resulted from a supervisory writ application by 
the defendants who were cast in judgment for remediation by an earlier jury 
verdict. After the judgment ordered the defendants to submit a remedial 
plan to the regulatory agency, Louisiana Department of Natural Resources 
(LDNR), the LDNR held a public hearing and issued what it considered to 
be the Most Feasible Plan (the LDNR Most Feasible Plan). The defendants 
moved to adopt the LDNR Most Feasible Plan as the final plan under Act 
312. The trial court, however, rejected the LDNR Most Feasible Plan and 
instead ordered LDNR to perform additional work because the plan was 
only partially a remediation plan. The issue on appeal was whether the trial 
court can order LDNR to re-submit a plan for remediation when the 
judgment called for such a plan and the originally submitted plan still 
requires evaluation. This required interpretation of Act 312 and 
consideration of “several res nova issues regarding the authority and roles 
of the trial court and LDNR after LDNR files its most feasible plan in the 
trial court record.”93 The court held there was no error in the trial court’s 
order requiring LDNR to submit a plan for remediation of issues instead of 
further testing where the judgment called for a remediation plan. The court 
relied on dicta from a Louisiana Supreme Court decision which indicated 
that “[t]hroughout the remediation process, the court remains the gatekeeper 
to ensure the purpose of the Act is accomplished – remediation of the 
property to the extent of the public’s interest.”94 
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VII. New Mexico 
A. Judicial Developments 
In T.H. McElvain Oil & Gas LP v. Benson-Montin-Greer Drilling 
Corp.,
95
 the court refused to set aside a 1948 final judgment in a quiet title 
case. Plaintiffs were the successors to three joint tenants who reserved all of 
the oil and gas underlying a 160-acre tract when conveying that tract in 
1931. In 1948, the 1931 grantee’s successor sought to quiet fee simple title 
to a larger tract which included the 160 acres. The court file from the 1948 
action revealed a complaint verified by the plaintiff and an affidavit from 
the New Mexico county sheriff both averring that various defendants, 
including the three joint tenants or their unknown heirs, could not be 
located after a due and diligent search. There was no description of any 
efforts undertaken in that search. Plaintiffs proved that, in 1948, the 
surviving joint tenant still resided in the same California city recited in the 
1931 deed, although under her married name, and could have been located 
with a truly diligent search. Judgment was entered by default in 1948 after 
notice by publication. The court found that the court file did not reveal any 
constitutionally defective effort at searching for parties, that the number of 
plaintiffs varies as to how a diligent search could have located the surviving 
joint tenant in 1948, many of those efforts were more appropriate to modern 
technology and availability of information, and that plaintiffs did not 
provide evidence of a “direct path” under which the 1948 plaintiff could 
have ascertained the “identity and whereabouts” of the surviving joint 
tenant to persuade the court of an obvious lack of diligence.
96
 The court 
cited a policy to protect reliance interests in property transactions created 
by old quiet title judgments. 
In Abraham v. WPX Energy Production, LLC,
97
 plaintiff sought to certify 
a class action for royalty and overriding royalty owners related to WPX’s 
alleged practice of WPX paying royalty and overriding royalty on a 
wellhead BTU value rather than paying on the value of natural gas liquids 
subsequently taken from the gas stream. Plaintiff proposed a class 
consisting of all overriding royalty and royalty owners paid by WPX from 
August 2006 forward with two subclasses: those covered by “proceeds” 
instruments and “market value” instruments.98 The court ruled that the 
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proposed class lacked commonality and that common issues would not 
predominate. Commonality was not present first because plaintiff could not 
demonstrate that the language in form oil and gas leases was substantively 
the same as the language in overriding royalty instruments which are not 
generally reserved on preprinted preexisting forms. Second, the court found 
that the duty of good faith and fair dealing and breach of implied covenant 
to market claims were not common because the court would be required to 
examine the language of individual instruments to determine whether there 
was a duty to pay royalties on extracted NGLs. Third, the court found that 
civil conspiracy claims lacked commonality because the division of all 
instruments into the simple categories of “proceeds” and “market value” 
was insufficient to describe legal relationships between the parties. Finally, 
the court held that, while there were some common issues, they would not 
predominate finding that evidence regarding lease language variation would 
likely consume most time at a trial. 
In XTO Energy, Inc. v. Furth,
99
 XTO sought restitution for overpayments 
it had made on a production payment reserved in 1964 covering 920-acres 
of land at $1,000.00 per acre. In 1985, the production payment was 
bequeathed to three testamentary trusts for the benefit of the owner’s 
daughters. The prior operator paid approximately one-half of the production 
payment and that XTO paid an additional $1.9 million dollars on the 
production payment before it fully realized its mistake. Defendants argued 
that the restitution claim was barred by XTO’s negligence. The court found 
that the overpayments could have been avoided by an exercise of due 
diligence, but that no bar existed because the voluntary payment rule 
required actual knowledge that the production payment had been satisfied 
when the payments occurred. However, the court denied plaintiff complete 
summary judgment as equitable considerations, namely that the beneficiary 
of the trusts were elderly women who rely on the trusts for financial support 
and medical care and that the trusts assets were less than the amount of 
restitution claimed, so that trial was needed on the equities as to the 
amount, if any, of restitution. 
The bankruptcy case of In Re Franco
100
 concerned a debtor and her 
husband who had conveyed to their son a portion of a tract of land under 
which they owned an undivided half interest in the minerals. The deed was 
not clear as to whether minerals were conveyed or reserved. The widow 
filed for bankruptcy protection. The son’s surviving wife sued the widow to 
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quiet title to the minerals and obtained a state court judgment. The 
bankruptcy court held that the automatic stay rendered the judgment void 
and declined to annul the automatic stay as it would remove a “potentially 
valuable asset” from the estate. 
B. Administrative Developments 
The New Mexico Oil Conservation Division issued a Notice
101
 to 
operators May 5, 2017 specifying that oil gathering lines as subject to 
health and safety regulations that previously were understood to apply to 
gas gathering lines. The Division also eliminated New Mexico’s 
requirement of an individual form for reporting of the hydraulic fracturing 
content used in well completion. Effective September 26, 2017, New 
Mexico operators are required to file with the FracFocus Chemical 
Disclosure Registry.
102
 
VIII. Ohio 
A. Judicial Developments 
As in prior years, the Supreme Court of Ohio remained engaged with oil 
and gas issues in 2017. The case of Bohlen v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, 
L.L.C.,
103
 involved the lessors’ claim that delayed rental payments and 
minimum royalty payments under their lease were functional equivalents 
such that the failure to pay a minimum royalty resulted in the lease’s 
automatic termination. Disagreeing, the court held that the clauses operated 
independently of one another and that a shortfall in the lessor’s minimum 
royalty did not cause the lease to expire. 
Ohio’s appellate courts also heard a number of oil and gas related cases 
this year. In Paulus v. Beck Energy Corp.,
104
 the court addressed, as a 
matter of first impression, a number of issues concerning Ohio’s standard 
for determining whether an oil and gas lease is producing in paying 
quantities. The court found, among other things, that (i) the determination 
of the period of time used to measure paying quantities is made by 
examining the totality of the circumstances and requires consideration of 
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the good faith of the lessee; (ii) royalties paid to the lessor must be deducted 
either from the lessee’s gross income or included as operating expenses 
when determining profitability; and (iii) that while an individual lessee’s 
own labor is not an operating expense when the lessee made no direct 
expenditure from gross receipts for his labor, the same is not true for the 
labor of a corporate lessee’s salaried employee. Such labor is a direct 
operating expense to be subtracted from the lessee’s income. 
In a decision that garnered significant attention within the industry, the 
court in Dundics v. Eric Petroleum Corp. ruled that landmen in Ohio were 
required to obtain real estate broker’s licenses in order to be entitled to 
compensation for brokering deals with landowners on behalf of oil and gas 
companies.
105
 There, the plaintiff landmen alleged that they were not 
compensated by the defendant oil and gas company for their work in 
assisting the company with negotiating and obtaining oil and gas leases in 
Ohio. The company moved to dismiss the lawsuit, asserting that the 
landmen were not licensed Ohio real estate brokers, and therefore, were 
barred from recovering under a state statute that precluded the recovery of 
compensation for “real estate . . . brokerage transaction[s]” unless the 
person brokering the transactions is a licensed real estate broker.
106
 
Agreeing with the lower court, the appellate court held that “real estate,” for 
purposes of the statute, was broadly defined to include “leaseholds as well 
as any and every interest or estate in land”—which, under Ohio law, 
includes oil and gas rights. And so, to be entitled to compensation for 
brokering in oil and gas rights, the landmen needed to be licensed. The 
court disagreed that the statute was inapplicable because oil and gas was 
different from traditional real property, noting that “the fact that oil and gas 
rights are different does not excuse third parties who ask the courts to 
enforce their engagement with either owners of surface real estate or those 
who wish to extract subsurface oil and gas from the real estate broker’s 
license requirement at issue here.”107  
A pre-civil war reservation was the subject of Sheba v. Kautz, which held 
that a deed executed in 1848 reserving “all of the minerals and coal” did not 
reserve oil and gas.
108
 In reaching its decision, the court turned to ordinary 
principles of contract interpretation and drew upon the decision in Detlor v. 
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Holland,
109
 to conclude that the parties to the deed did not intend to reserve 
oil and gas because the deed predated the development of oil and gas in 
Ohio. The court specifically noted that there was no indication that oil and 
gas were being produced in the immediate vicinity or in the general area or 
elsewhere when the deed was executed. 
In Barclay Petro., Inc. v. Bailey,
 110
 the current owners of property 
covered by a lease originally executed in 1985 sought to terminate the 
lease, alleging it had expired for lack of commercial production some years 
earlier, before the current owners had acquired the property. During that 
period of non-commercial production, the lessee continued to operate and 
maintain the well on the property, which also provided household gas. The 
evidence showed that the prior owners of the property were content with the 
supply of household gas, that household gas was continually supplied 
without any pronged interruption and that the lessee properly remedied any 
issue with the household gas supply. The lessee contended, among other 
things, that the prior owners had agreed that the supply of household gas 
would be sufficient to hold the lease, and that the doctrines of modification, 
waiver and estoppel barred the current owners from claiming that the lease 
expired. Reversing the trial court’s finding in favor of the lessee, the court 
of appeals determined that the lease had expired on its own terms and that 
no affirmative action was necessary on the part of the lessors to formally 
cause the lease’s termination. Additionally, the court found that the lease 
was not modified by the parties’ course of performance or by oral 
agreement because the change in the parties’ understanding regarding the 
lessee’s obligations was not supported by independent consideration. 
Finally, the court rejected the equitable defenses of estoppel and waiver, 
finding that the supply of household gas was a benefit under the lease, and 
that the prior owners’ acceptance of benefits was not inconsistent with the 
(subsequent) owners’ position that the lease had expired. 
Rudolph v. Viking Int’l Res. Co. 111 involved a claim that an oil and gas 
lease expired under its habendum clause due to an interruption in 
production. One of the issues before the court was which statute of 
limitations applied: the 21-year statute pertaining to the recovery of real 
property, or the 15-year statute pertaining to actions on a written contract. 
The court found that it was the 21-year statute, concluding that because an 
oil and gas lease is regarded as a fee simple determinable interest, its 
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expiration does not necessarily give rise to a cause of action for a breach of 
the lease. Instead, the appropriate action is one for a declaratory judgment 
that the lease has expired, which is a claim in “the nature of an action to 
recover title to or possession of real property” to which Ohio’s statute of 
limitations for recovery of real property was applicable.
112
 But the court 
determined that on the particular facts before it, the 21-year limitations 
period had not yet lapsed. The court also went on to repudiate its earlier 
statements in Schultheiss v. Heinrich Enterprises, Inc.,
113
 where it 
suggested that no statute of limitations ever applied to a lease expiration 
claim. 
Blackstone v. Moore
114
 interpreted a statutory exception to “marketable 
record title” under Ohio’s Marketable Title Act (OMTA), Ohio Rev. Code 
§ 5301.47, et seq. The court held that whether a reference to an interest 
inherent in the muniments of the chain of record title is “specific”—and 
thus not extinguished by the OMTA, or general, depends upon four 
factors: (1) does the reference state the type of mineral right created; (2) 
does the reference state the nature of the encumbrance (an estate, profit, 
lease, or easement); (3) does the reference state the original owner of the 
interest; and (4) does the reference identify the instrument creating the 
interest. In so holding, the court expressly rejected the decision of another 
appellate district in Duvall v. Hibbs,
115
 which held that a reference to an 
interest inherent in the muniments of the chain of record title is specific 
only if it recites the volume and page number of the instrument creating the 
interest. 
Ohio courts continued to hear cases involving Ohio’s Dormant Mineral 
Act (ODMA), Ohio Rev. Code § 5301.56, et seq. In a decision of first 
impression, the court in Devitis v. Draper held that oil and gas royalty 
interests may be abandoned under the ODMA.
116
 The court looked to its 
prior decision in Pollock v. Mooney,
117
 which found that royalty interests 
are subject to extinguishment under the OMTA. In Pollock, the court relied 
on broad language in the OMTA that applied the act’s provisions to all 
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interests, claims, or charges whatsoever. While noting that the language of 
the ODMA is different than the OMTA, the Draper court found that 
parallels can be drawn” between the two statutes because the ODMA’s 
definition of “mineral interest” was also broad and included the catch-all 
phrase “regardless of how the interest is created and of the form of the 
interest.” Moreover, the court found that conceptually, a royalty interest is 
simply one stick within the bundle of attributes comprising the mineral 
estate, and that it may be separately transferred. Therefore, a royalty interest 
fell within the definition of a “mineral interest” under the ODMA. 
Ultimately, the court went on to find that the particular royalty interest at 
issue, while potentially subject to abandonment under the ODMA, was 
preserved through the timely filing of a claim of preservation. 
Courts also wrestled with the issue of whether certain parties were 
“holders” under the ODMA, and therefore, were entitled to assert claims to 
a severed mineral interest. In M&H Partnership v. Hines,
118
 the court 
interpreted the term “holder” to include the heirs and devisees of the record 
owner of the severed mineral interest that succeed to the severed mineral 
interest by intestacy or devise. In a follow-up decision, Warner v. 
Palmer,
119
 the same court further clarified that a “holder” includes heirs of 
the record holder of a severed mineral interest, even if such heirs did not 
acquire their interest through a chain of title of conveyances or probate 
estates that specifically transmitted the mineral interest. 
Finally, in Lutz v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C.,
120
 the court 
concluded, as a matter of first impression, that Ohio state courts would 
adopt the “at the well” rule regarding the deduction of post-production 
costs. In Lutz, the plaintiff-lessors had filed a class action complaint, 
alleging the lessee underpaid gas royalties under the terms of their oil and 
gas leases by allocating to the lessors their share of post-production costs 
when calculating royalties. One of the lease forms at issue contained “at the 
well” royalty language, which the lessee argued permitted the deduction of 
post-production costs from the downstream sales price of natural gas to 
work back to the price of the gas “at the well” when calculating royalties. 
The lessors, however, urged the court to adopt the “marketable product 
rule,” (specifically, West Virginia’s formulation of the rule) which may 
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require that certain downstream costs, such as costs for compression, 
dehydration, processing, and transportation of gas, be borne solely by the 
lessee. In April 2015, the district court certified the question of whether 
Ohio follows the “at the well” rule or the marketable product rule to the 
Ohio Supreme Court. Although the court accepted the certified question, it 
ultimately declined to answer it, concluding that oil and gas leases are 
contracts and the “the rights and remedies of the parties are controlled by 
the specific language of their lease agreement[.]”121 
Back at the district court, the lessee then filed a motion for partial 
summary judgment as to the “at the well” lease form, which the district 
court granted. Holding that the “at the well” language in the lease was clear 
and unambiguous, the district court found that it referred to the “location at 
which the gas is valued for purposes of calculating a lessor’s royalties”—
i.e., at the well.
122
 Conversely, applying the marketable product rule, as 
urged by the plaintiffs, “runs the risk of giving the lessor the benefit of a 
bargain not made.”123 
B. Administrative Developments 
In the summer of 2017, the Division issued revised guidelines for 
statutory unitization applications.
124
 Among other things, the guidelines 
now provide for a Division review of applications on a rolling basis and 
require that applications include pre-filed testimonies by a geologist, 
engineer, and landman, as well as six specific exhibits, including one that 
lists properties within the proposed unit subject to pending ownership 
litigation.  
IX. Oklahoma 
A. Judicial Developments 
In Kamo Electric Cooperative v. Nichols,
125
 Kamo appealed a judgment 
awarding the landowners $30,715 for an easement across 3.9 acres of rural 
land used primarily for cattle. The parties were in agreement that the price 
for the outright sale of fee simple title to similar agricultural land was 
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$2,000 per acre. However, the expert appraiser for the landowners testified 
that “the 3.9 acres taken was worth approximately $8,000 per acre based on 
the negotiated acquisition price of similar easements by public utilities in 
the area.”126 The jury returned a verdict for $30,615 (approximately $7,800 
per acre). Kamo appealed. The court of appeals concluded that a transaction 
involving the purchase of an easement on property that will be taken by 
condemnation, if negotiations are not successful, is not a transaction 
between a willing seller and willing buyer without compulsion and does not 
reflect the market value of the property taken. As a consequence, such 
transactions are generally inadmissible as comparable sales to show the 
value of similar property in a condemnation proceeding. The court reversed 
and remanded.  
The case of Strack v. Continental Resources, Inc.
127
 was filed on 
November 4, 2010, with the plaintiff mineral owners asking the district 
court to certify a class of royalty owners with respect to claims of alleged 
royalty underpayments, insufficient reporting and failure to receive the best 
price by the defendant. On January 12, 2015, Strack filed an amended 
motion to certify class, seeking a “hybrid, issue class action under 12 O.S. 
2011 and Supp. 2013, § 2013(B)(1) and/or (B)(2) and § 2023(C)(6)(a).”128 
More specifically, in the words of the court, plaintiffs sought certification 
with respect to approximately 48 legal issues. In objecting to this approach 
to class certification, the defendant complained that no Oklahoma court had 
ever certified a hybrid or issue class, and that the plaintiffs were essentially 
seeking 48 advisory opinions on issues that did not resolve the underlying 
claims, on issues unrelated to numerous prospective class members. The 
district court granted Strack’s motion to certify class. The court of appeals 
reversed, observing at the outset of its decision that this is an issue of first 
impression in Oklahoma, as no Oklahoma court has granted a hybrid class 
action or applied Section 2023(C)(6)(a) to maintain a class action with 
respect to particular issues. In a lengthy opinion, the court of appeals 
concluded that the requirements for class certification under Section 2023 
were not met and it reversed the class certification order of the district 
court. 
The Strack decision is one of at least four court of appeals royalty law 
decisions recognizing that the Oklahoma Supreme Court has never 
provided a definition of the critical term “marketable product,” as used in 
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its landmark 1998 Mittelstaedt
129
 decision.
130
 Mittelstaedt addresses 
circumstances in which oil and gas lessees may include in the computation 
of royalty payments a proportionate share of certain post-production costs. 
Consequently, oil and gas producers, royalty owners and the lower 
Oklahoma courts have no clear guidance as to what is required for gas to be 
considered a “marketable product” under Mittelstaedt.  
In contrast to the outcome in Strack, the case of Naylor Farms, Inc. v. 
Chaparral Energy, LLC,
131
 resulted in an order granting certification of a 
limited class. Naylor Farms brought a putative class action suit on behalf of 
royalty owners in certain Oklahoma wells seeking to recover for the alleged 
underpayment of royalties by Chaparral. The court described the lawsuit as 
“similar to several other lawsuits filed by royalty owners claiming that well 
operators (or non-operators which marketed the gas) have underpaid 
royalties in violation of Oklahoma law by improperly deducting certain 
costs incurred in making the gas marketable.”132 In commenting on how 
courts have previously denied class certification in certain cases where a 
remarkable variety of royalty provisions were presented in the case, the 
court observed there were “several distinctions between this case and those 
in which classes were not certified or in which the certification orders were 
vacated.”133 After substantial further discussion of the particular attributes 
perceived to be present in the Naylor Farms case, the court granted class 
certification, but excluded the fraud claims from the class and limited the 
certification order to a specified type of oil and gas lease. On June 7, 2017, 
the Tenth Circuit granted Chaparral’s petition for permission to appeal 
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under Fed. R. App. P. 5 and Fed R. Civ. P. 23(f).
134
 The case remained on 
appeal at the time this paper was submitted for publication. 
In Blair v. Natural Gas Anadarko Co.,
135
 the plaintiff mineral owners 
(Blair) contended that, following three specific 90-day spans of time, the 
well did not cumulatively produce in paying quantities. Blair argued that, 
during the three 90-day periods, the total lifting costs at the end of those 
periods exceeded the value of the oil sold, causing the cessation of 
production clause to terminate the lease. The court of appeals found the 
case of Pack v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc.,
136
 to be dispositive, and further 
found that the trial court erred in concluding that production had ceased 
during the 90-day time periods relied upon by Blair. The court found that 
the well’ demonstrated production “capability” caused the lease to continue 
under the habendum clause, even though defendants did not “market” 
production at certain times. The court observed that the cessation of 
production clause did not spring into operation because the well was 
capable of production in commercial quantities at all times, and remanded 
the case with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants. 
The case of Newkumet Exploration v. Saxet Corp.
137
 involved oil and gas 
leases of Newkumet burdened by an overriding royalty interest held by 
Saxet. Nekumet released the leases because of alleged issues concerning the 
validity of the leases and uncertainties as to ownership. Newkumet acquired 
new leases and took the position that Saxet’s overriding royalty interest 
terminated by its terms when the original leases were released. Saxet 
asserted that there was no justification for the release and that Newkumet 
released the leases to extinguish Saxet’s override. The trial court entered 
summary judgment in favor of Newkumet. Saxet appealed. The court of 
appeals reviewed its prior decision in Olson v. Continental Resources, 
Inc.
138
 The court observed that, as in Olson, it was undisputed here that the 
original leases contained a specific provision allowing the lessee to 
surrender and release the leases at any time. Additionally, the assignment of 
overriding royalty interest in favor of Saxet did not contain a provision 
stating that the override applied to extensions and renewals of the original 
leases. The court noted that the assignment of an overriding royalty interest 
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does not, by itself, create a fiduciary relationship between assignor and 
assignee. However, such a relationship may arise from other factors. The 
court concluded that there were no facts supporting the existence of a 
fiduciary relationship between Saxet and Newkumet which might have 
prevented the termination of the override. The court affirmed the trial 
court’s decision in favor of Newkumet. 
The case of Max Oil Company Inc. v. Range Production Company 
LLC,
139
 involved a suit by the plaintiff owners of certain producing oil and 
gas wells against Range. The plaintiffs alleged that Range’s oil and gas 
hydraulic fracture operations permanently damaged their nearby producing 
oil and gas wells. The plaintiffs sued Range alleging negligence, trespass, 
nuisance and conversion. Range filed a motion to dismiss asserting, in part, 
that the plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred under the two-year statute of 
limitations under OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 95(3) (2017). The 
arguments on appeal were limited to the claims of trespass and nuisance. 
However, after reviewing the alleged facts the plaintiffs knew and the dates 
on which the plaintiffs knew them, both the district court and the 10th 
Circuit concluded that their suit was filed beyond the two-year limitations 
period.  
In Stephens Production Co. v. Tripco, Inc.,
140
 the issue before the court 
was whether the statutory Pugh clause in OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52 § 
87.1(b) (2017) applies to a secondary recovery unit formed under the 
Unitization Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52 § 287.1, et seq. (2017). The 
answer to that question, in the context of the present case, would determine 
which oil and gas leases were in effect as to the unitized field at issue in this 
case. Specifically, Stephens argued that the statutory Pugh clause had 
operated to extinguish Tripco’s lease as to right outside a specified tract. 
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Tripco. Stephens 
appealed. In its review of the pertinent statutes, the court of appeals 
emphasized the repeated references in the statutory Pugh clause to “spacing 
units” created under Section 87.1. The court of appeals agreed that the Pugh 
clause in § 87.1 does not apply to the field-wide enhanced recovery units 
created by the Unitization Act of 52 O.S. § 287.1, et seq.” The court of 
appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, found that the statutory 
Pugh clause did not apply in this case, and that the Tripco lease was valid as 
a result of being held by production from the secondary recovery unit 
formed under OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52 § 287.1, et seq. (2017).  
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The court in Bebout v. Ewell,
141
 was presented with an attempt to set 
aside a district court order entered some 32 years earlier distributing assets 
in the probate of an estate. Two grandsons of the decedent alleged that the 
final order in the estate was void on the face of the judgment roll and 
sought to quiet title to certain mineral interests in the grandsons. The 
district court found that the final order was void for lack of required notice 
to the grandsons. The court of appeals affirmed. The Oklahoma Supreme 
Court granted certiorari. The grandsons contended that, in probate 
proceedings, a failure to send copies of the final account to known heirs or 
beneficiaries, providing notice of the personal representative’s adverse 
demands upon the estate, violated due process. However, the court found 
that the wording in the notice sent to the grandsons was sufficient. It 
informed them of the date, time, and place of the hearing, and apprised the 
grandsons that their grandfather's estate was to be settled at the hearing and 
that all persons interested had to appear to dispute the proposed distribution. 
Critically, the notice informed the grandsons that the final account and 
petition with will annexed were on file with the court and that the account 
would be settled and allowed, putting the Grandsons on further inquiry 
notice. Had they investigated the matter by either inspecting the documents 
in the court file or attending the hearing, they could have easily ascertained 
that the entire estate was to be distributed to others and that nothing was to 
be left to either of them. The final order was not void for lack of proper 
notice. 
In Vance v. Enogex Gas Gathering, L.L.C.,
142
 Enogex appealed the trial 
court’s judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff-landowners in a 
suit alleging oil field pipeline leakage and pollution. Enogex witnesses 
testified at trial that they repaired a pinhole leak in the pipeline and did not 
hear any complaints from the landowners until two years later when the 
lawsuit was filed. Enogex’s expert testified that he then investigated the 
claim and again found no groundwater pollution and only a very small 
amount of soil contamination. The landowners presented certain evidence 
in support of their claims and requested damages in the amount of 
$400,000.00 for diminution in the value of their property and punitive 
damages. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the landowners for 
$25,000.00 in damage to the property, but awarded no damages on 
landowners’ claims for personal inconvenience, annoyance and discomfort. 
The jury also found clear and convincing evidence that Enogex acted in 
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reckless disregard of the rights of the landowners and returned a verdict for 
$25,000.00 in punitive damages. Enogex appealed the judgment only as to 
the award of punitive damages and did not challenge the $25,000.00 
compensatory award. After reviewing the aspects of the trial court’s rulings 
that were complained of on appeal in detail, the court affirmed the 
judgment below. 
In Stephens Production Co. v. Larsen,
143
 Stephens filed a condemnation 
action against the defendant landowners under Oklahoma’s underground 
gas storage statutes that provide certain condemnation rights. Stephens 
sought to condemn underground gas storage easements and surface 
easements to complete a natural gas storage facility on and underneath 
some 900 acres of property. Approximately 140 defendants were originally 
named in Stephens’ petition. Upon issuance of the report of the 
commissioners, all defendants except Larsen settled with Stephens. Larsen 
owned an 80-acre tract within the 900-acre area. The commissioners valued 
Larsen’s property that would be taken, and the damage to the remainder of 
his lands, as being $12,400.00. The case proceeded to a non-jury trial. 
Larsen’s expert witness testified that $419,000.00 would be just 
compensation to Larsen. Stephens’ expert testified that $9,000.00 would be 
just compensation. The trial court determined that $9,000.00 represented 
just compensation. Larsen appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the trial 
court’s decision. The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted Larsen’s petition 
for certiorari. The court noted that Larsen’s expert’s valuation of 
$419,000—which constituted more than eight times the fee simple value of 
the entire 80-acre parcel—was premised on the value of the property upon 
the completion and operation of an underground gas storage facility. Yet, 
the evidence at trial indicated that there was no active market for 
underground storage in the area at issue in this case. The court affirmed the 
district court’s valuation of $9,000.00, stating in part: 
[W]ithout any evidence from Mr. Larsen regarding the 
reasonable probability of combination or the market demand for 
underground gas storage in the area, the highest and best use of 
the property was the use to which it was subject at the time of 
the taking--natural resource, agricultural, and recreational use. 
The record supports the trial court's valuation of just 
compensation at $9,000.00.
144
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The court further observed that the law does not permit the court to fix 
speculative, boom or fancy values on condemned property. 
The case of Sierra Club v. Chesapeake Operating, LLC,
145
 involved a 
lawsuit by the Sierra Club for declaratory and injunctive relief under the 
citizen suit provision of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, amended as the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.
146
 The plaintiff alleged in its 
complaint that that the deep injection of liquid waste from oil and gas 
extraction activities by defendants . . . has contributed, and continues to 
contribute, to an increase in earthquakes throughout the State of Oklahoma 
and in southern Kansas.”147 The defendants filed multiple motions to 
dismiss the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The 
defendants asserted multiple grounds for their motions including abstention 
and primary jurisdiction doctrines, and plaintiff’s failure to join in the suit 
every company disposing of liquid wastes from oil and gas extraction 
activities into injection wells. After a lengthy discussion of certain of the 
underlying facts and applicable law, the court granted the motions to 
dismiss under the Burford abstention doctrine and the primary jurisdiction 
doctrine. The substantial work of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission 
in addressing the earthquake-related issues asserted in the complaint was 
described in detail in the court’s ruling.  
B. Administrative Developments 
Documents filed in the rulemakings referred to below can be viewed on 
the Oklahoma Corporation Commission’s (Commission's) website at 
www.occeweb.com.  
Amendments to Title 165, Chapter 10 of the Oklahoma Administrative 
Code (OAC), which comprises the Commission’s Oil & Gas Conservation 
Rules, were addressed in Cause RM No. 201600019. Following is a brief 
summary of certain of the amendments which became effective on 
September 11, 2017:  
OAC 165:10-1-4 was amended to update the list of effective dates for 
OAC 165:10 rulemakings; OAC 165:10-1-7 to update the list of Oil and 
Gas Conservation Division prescribed forms and to add new forms; OAC 
165:10-3-10 regarding the use of diesel fuel as the base fluid for hydraulic 
fracturing operations and reporting of impacts of hydraulic fracturing 
operations on other wells; OAC 165:10-3-25 concerning Completion 
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Reports and amended Completion Reports; OAC 165:10-5-5 with respect to 
applications for approval of enhanced recovery injection and disposal 
operations; OAC 165:10-5-6 regarding testing and monitoring requirements 
for enhanced recovery injection wells and disposal wells; OAC 165:10-5-7 
concerning monitoring and reporting requirements for enhanced recovery 
injection wells, disposal wells and storage wells, and to include a reference 
to OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 § 52 and provisions appearing therein; OAC 
165:10-5-10 with respect to transfer of authority to inject concerning 
underground injection wells; OAC 165:10-5-15 regarding reporting 
requirements for simultaneous injection wells, and OAC 165:10-7-19 was 
amended concerning land application of water-based fluids from earthen 
pits, tanks and pipeline construction.  
OAC 165:10-7-26 was amended with respect to land application of 
contaminated soils and petroleum hydrocarbon-based drill cuttings; OAC 
165:10-9-1 concerning use of commercial pits; OAC 165:10-9-3 regarding 
commercial disposal well surface facilities; OAC 165:10-11-3 with respect 
to plugging of wells; OAC 165:10-11-6 regarding plugging and plugging 
back procedures for wells. 
An emergency rulemaking was filed in Cause RM No. 201700009 
regarding OAC 165:10-3-28. Amendments to the rule were needed on an 
emergency basis so that the Commission’s Oil and Gas Conservation rules 
set forth in the Oklahoma Administrative Code (OAC) 165:10 would 
conform to provisions in Senate Bill No. 867-the Oklahoma Energy Jobs 
Act of 2017-which became effective August 25, 2017. The proposed 
changes to OAC 165:10 were to address changes to OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
tit.52 § 87.1 and OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.52 §§ 87.1 and 87.6 through 87.9. 
The changes include the addition of definitions for new terms, deletion of 
definitions for other terms, and adding references to 1,280-acre horizontal 
well units. 
Amendments to Title 165, Chapter 5 of the Oklahoma Administrative 
Code, which comprises the Commission’s Rules of Practice, were 
addressed in Cause RM No. 201700001. Following is a brief summary of 
certain of the amendments which became effective on September 11, 2017: 
OAC 165:5-1-3 was amended concerning definitions; OAC 165:5-1-4 
with respect to filings with the Court Clerk; OAC 165:5-1-5 regarding 
filing of documents; OAC 165:5-1-9 concerning telephonic and 
videoconferencing testimony; OAC 165:5-1-26 concerning receipt of 
pollution complaints; OAC 165:5-1-27 with respect to review of pollution 
complaints; OAC 165:5-1-28 regarding closure of pollution complaints; 
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OAC 165:5-1-29 concerning pollution complaint resolution; OAC 165:5-1-
30 with respect to reporting of pollution complaints. 
OAC 165:5-5-1 was amended regarding dockets; OAC 165:5-7-1 with 
respect to application and notice requirements; OAC 165:5-7-15 is revoked 
regarding tertiary crude oil recovery project certification; OAC 165:5-7-30 
was amended with respect to amendment of existing orders or permits 
authorizing injection for enhanced recovery, saltwater disposal or LPG 
storage wells; OAC 165:5-7-60 concerning reciprocity of final orders 
between states with respect to electric companies; OAC 165:5-21-3.1 is a 
new rule regarding applications to permanently close underground storage 
tanks in place; Appendix J concerning a witness identification form was 
revoked and a new Appendix J promulgated with respect to a witness 
identification form for presentation of testimony by telephone or 
videoconferencing connection. 
An emergency rulemaking was filed in Cause RM No. 201700008 
regarding OAC 165:5-7-6, OAC 165:5-7-6.1, OAC 165:5-7-6.2 and OAC 
165:5-7-7. Amendments to the rules were needed on an emergency basis so 
that the Commission’s Rules of Practice set forth in the Oklahoma 
Administrative Code (OAC) 165:5 would conform to provisions in Senate 
Bill No. 867-the Oklahoma Energy Jobs Act of 2017-which became 
effective August 25, 2017. The proposed changes to OAC 165:5 were to 
address changes to OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.52 § 87.1 and OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
tit.52 §§ 87.1 and 87.6 through 87.9. The changes include modification of 
terms regarding applications requesting the issuance of orders concerning 
horizontal well unitizations and multiunit horizontal wells in targeted 
reservoirs, addressing authorizations for expenditure regarding applications 
for pooling orders, as well as requirements for horizontal spacing units.  
X. Pennsylvania 
A. Legislative Developments 
The House of Representatives passed House Bill 674,
148
 the fiscal code 
bill for 2017, on October 24, 2017. The bill was presented to Governor 
Wolf on October 25, 2017 and approved by the Governor on October 30, 
2017. Section 1610-E of the bill, entitled “Temporary Cessation of Oil and 
Gas Wells,” establishes that a lessor shall be deemed to acknowledge that a 
period of nonproduction under an oil and gas lease is a temporary cessation 
insufficient to terminate the lease, and the lessor may not allege that the 
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lease is terminated if either of the following occur: (1) before the lessor 
claims that the lease has expired, the lessee restarts production from the 
lease and the lessor accepts a royalty payment; or (2) the lessee drills a new 
well on the lease after giving the lessor 90 days to object. 
On March 21, 2017, Governor Wolf announced that the Department of 
Environmental Protection launched an e-submissions public review tool to 
allow the public to more quickly and easily view documents submitted by 
unconventional oil and gas operators.
149
 The public review tool enables 
citizens to search for documents by various parameters, including well site 
and operator, and houses documents including well development impound 
registrations, well completion reports, and post-drilling site restoration 
reports. 
B. Judicial Developments 
On October 8, 2016, the Environmental Quality Board passed final 
rulemaking on regulations related to surface activities associated with the 
development of unconventional oil and gas wells, which amended Chapter 
78 (relating to oil and gas wells) and added Chapter 78a (relating to 
unconventional wells).
150
 Prior to this final rulemaking, the surface activity 
requirements in Chapter 78 had not been updated since 2001.  
The rules set performance standards governing surface activities 
associated with the development of unconventional well sites. For example, 
Section 78a.68a requires pipeline operators conducting horizontal 
directional drilling beneath a body of water or a watercourse to notify the 
DEP at least 24 hours before beginning said drilling. The rules also 
implement more stringent requirements for the storing of wastewater at 
impoundments, and in large part prohibit any disposal of drill cuttings at 
well sites. Section 78a.56 prohibits the use of pits for temporary storage on 
unconventional well sites, and Section 78a.59a establishes requirements for 
impoundment embankments. Section 78a.59b sets requirements for 
registration of new and existing well development impoundments, 
including standards for the location and construction of well development 
impoundments.  
The court enjoined certain provisions of the Chapter 78a regulations on 
November 8, 2016.
151
 First, the court enjoined portions of certain provisions 
                                                                                                                 
 149. https://www.governor.pa.gov/governor-wolf-announces-launch-of-oil-and-gas-
electronic-submissions-review-for-accelerated-public-access/. 
 150. 25 PA. CODE Chs. 78,78a; see also 46 PA. BULL. 6431 (Oct. 8, 2016). 
 151. See Marcellus Shale Coal. v. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., No. 573 MD 2016, 2016 Pa. 
Commw. (Unpublished), LEXIS 830, (Pa. Commw. Ct. Nov. 8, 2016).  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol4/iss2/2
2018]  Legal Developments in 2017 Affecting Oil and Gas 241 
 
 
that mandated that unconventional operators must provide certain 
information to listed public resource agencies within a specified distance of 
a proposed well, including a plat and proposed measures to mitigate 
potential damage to public resources. The court also enjoined Chapter 78a 
provisions that required unconventional operators to identify and monitor 
and possibly remediate active, inactive, orphan, abandoned, or plugged 
wells under certain conditions. The court held that these requirements were 
problematic because a well operator could be required to monitor and even 
plug wells that may be inaccessible to the operator or off-lease. The court 
also enjoined the imposition of new construction standards for existing 
impoundments that were built pursuant to permits and the DEP’s view of 
the law at the time, finding that if these provisions were not enjoined, the 
Marcellus Shale Coalition would be unable to recover hundreds of 
thousands to millions of dollars to retrofit existing impoundments.  
Finally, the court enjoined the provisions of Chapter 78a regarding well 
site restoration standards and found that there was a legal question as to 
whether the new well site restoration standards impose requirements in 
excess of what is required by the Clean Stream Laws. Currently, Act 13 
provides that erosion and sediment control regulations must comply with 
the Clean Streams Law, and the court was persuaded that there was a 
substantial legal question as to whether Section 78a.65(d) abrogates any 
requirements or exemptions in the Clean Streams Law. The DEP has 
appealed the court’s injunction to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.152 
The Commonwealth Court issued a published opinion interpreting the 
impact fee provision in Act 13.
153
 In Snyder Bros. v. Pa. Public Utility 
Commission, the issue on appeal was the statutory interpretation of the 
definition of “stripper well” in Act 13, which is not required to pay impact 
fees. The court was tasked with determining whether the General Assembly 
intended the word “any” to mean “one” or “every.” The court held that the 
phrase “any” meant “any” or “one” and not “all” or “every” based on the 
plain language of Act 13, thus a stripper well is not required to pay an 
impact fee if it is a well that produces less than 90,000 cubic feet of gas in 
at least one month. On October 18, 2017, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
granted the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission’s petition for 
allowance of appeal.
154
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Federal courts in Pennsylvania have been wrestling with the question of 
arbitrability in royalty class action disputes involving oil and gas leases 
with arbitration provisions. In Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C. v. Scout 
Petroleum LLC,
155
 the court held that courts, and not arbitrators, decide 
questions of class arbitrability absent clear and unmistakable evidence 
otherwise.
156
 Following the decision by the Third Circuit in Scout I, the trial 
court judge was tasked with resolving the second issue raised in the 
complaint, which involved whether the contracts permitted class arbitration, 
or whether only individual or bilateral arbitration was permitted.
157
 The 
court noted that in Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C. v. Ostroski,
158
 the court 
had held that class arbitration was not permitted in a similar lease provision, 
which provided that, in the event of a disagreement between lessor and 
lessee concerning the lease, the resolution of all such disputes would be 
determined in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration 
Association. The district court judge adopted the reasoning in Ostroski and 
held that the leases only permitted individual or bilateral arbitration rather 
than class arbitration. Scout Petroleum filed an appeal to the Third Circuit 
on May 9, 2017.
159
  
In Valley Rod & Gun Club v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 
Chesapeake constructed a natural gas well pursuant to an oil and gas lease 
which granted Chesapeake “such exclusive rights as may be necessary or 
convenient for Lessee, at its election, to explore for, develop, produce, 
measure and market production from the premises....”160 The oil and gas 
was severed from the surface of the property, and the surface owners filed 
suit alleging misappropriation and conversion of the rock, fill, mulch, and 
other surface material that Chesapeake used to build a well pad on its 
property. The district court granted summary judgment to Chesapeake, 
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finding that both the lease and Pennsylvania law allow for a lessee to use as 
much of the surface property as is “reasonably necessary” to extract the oil 
and gas. Because Chesapeake is the exclusive owner of the oil and gas 
underlying the property, Chesapeake has the right to use as much of the 
surface as is reasonably necessary to develop and produce the gas 
underlying the surface tract. Valley Rod filed an appeal to the Third Circuit 
on May 1, 2017.
161
 The appeal was dismissed on September 8, 2017.
162
 
In Cardinale v. R.E. Gas Development, LLC, plaintiffs brought a breach 
of contract class action alleging that the defendants failed to pay pre-paid 
rental or bonus payments under leases purportedly executed with the 
plaintiffs.
163
 The leases were substantially identical in all material respects 
except for the name of the lessor, the description of the leased area, and the 
amount of payment because the amount depended on the acreage covered 
by the lease. The leases provided that payment was supposed to occur 
within 60 days of the receipt of the executed lease and order for payment. 
The defendants’ obligation to pay the bonus payments was subject only to 
its inspection, approval of the surface, geology and title of the leased 
premises. The court found that class certification was proper because there 
common questions predominated over individual questions, including: (1) 
whether the defendants entered into a contract with each class member; (2) 
at what point the contract was executed; (3) when the defendants were 
obligated to pay the bonus payments to class members; (4) whether 
defendants’ obligation to pay the bonus payments was contingent only upon 
the three reasons stated in the contract; (5) whether the bonus payments 
absolute at the expiration of the 60 days; and (6) whether the 60 days ran by 
calendar days or banking days. 
In EQT Production Company v. Borough of Jefferson Hills, the Borough 
of Jefferson Hills appealed a trial court decision reversing the Borough 
Council’s denial of a conditional use application by EQT Production 
Company (EQT) to construct and operate a natural gas production facility. 
The Council denied the application on the basis that EQT had failed to 
satisfy a zoning ordinance which provided that the use shall not endanger 
the public health, safety or welfare nor deteriorate the environment, as a 
result of being located on the property where it is proposed. The trial court 
reversed the Council’s decision, and the Council appealed. The 
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Commonwealth Court held EQT had successfully established compliance 
with specific requirements of the ordinance, and that the burden shifted to 
the Borough to prove that there was a high degree of probability that the 
conditional use will constitute a detriment to the public health, safety, and 
welfare exceeding that ordinarily to be expected from the proposed use. The 
court concluded that the Borough did not meet its burden because the 
evidence provided by the Borough was speculative, and the lay and expert 
testimony was not specific to the site proposal at issue. The court concluded 
that “given the fact that there has been a legislative decision that the 
particular use is presumptively consistent with the health, safety, and 
welfare of the community”, the Borough’s testimony was insufficient to 
satisfy its burden.
164
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued a landmark decision
165
 
addressing the issue of whether certain statutory enactments related to funds 
generated from the leasing of forest and park lands owned by the 
Commonwealth for oil and gas exploration and extraction were 
constitutional under Article I, Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, 
known as the Environmental Rights Amendment.
166
 The Pennsylvania 
Environmental Defense Foundation (PEDF) filed a declaratory judgment 
action against the Commonwealth challenging budget-related decisions 
from 2009 to 2015 related to leasing lands owned by the Commonwealth 
for oil and gas development and the use of the monies in the Oil and Gas 
Lease Fund, and whether these actions violated the Amendment.
167
 On 
appeal, the court held that the proper standard of review was described in 
the text of the Amendment as based on the underlying principles of 
Pennsylvania trust law in effect at the time of its enactment. The court 
noted that the Amendment granted two rights to the people of the 
Commonwealth: 1) the right to clean air, water, and the preservation of 
natural values of the environment, and 2) a public trust pursuant to which 
natural resources are the corpus of the trust, the Commonwealth the trustee, 
and the people the named beneficiaries. The court concluded that because 
the Amendment creates a trust, the proceeds that the Commonwealth 
generates by selling its oil and gas reserves remain in the corpus of the 
trust. Second, the court determined that the assets of the trust should be 
used for conversation and maintenance purposes because the Amendment 
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provided that the trust should be used for the benefit of all of the people. 
Thus, the court held that the statutes at issue that diverted oil and gas sale 
proceeds to programs other than those for conserving and maintaining 
public natural resources were unconstitutional.  
XI. Texas 
A. Judicial Developments 
In Wenske v. Ealy,
168
 a divided 5-4 decision, the Texas Supreme Court 
analyzed the difference between the language “a reservation from” and an 
“exception to” in a conveyance of minerals. The Wenskes bought a 55 acre 
mineral estate. The two grantors each reserved a 1/8
th
 NPRI for a period of 
25 years, resulting in a combined one-fourth NPRI over all the oil, gas and 
other minerals produced from the property. Subsequently, the Wenskes sold 
the property to the Ealys by Warranty Deed. After reviewing lengthy 
provisions in the deed providing for new reservations to the Wenskes and 
referring to the prio reservations, the trial court granted summary judgment 
that the Ealys and Wenskes must share the NPRI’s burden in proportion to 
their interests. Noting that neither party argued that the deed was 
ambiguous, the Texas Supreme Court agreed and proceeded to review the 
intent expressed in the wording of the deed. The court held that there was 
not a clear expression of intent that the Ealys interest should be the sole 
interest subject to the NPRI, and that the parties should share the NPRI 
burden in proportion to each of their interests. The practical result of this 
holding is to avoid an unintended result where the buyer exclusively bears 
the NPRI. The Court further noted that it did not hold that all conveyances 
of a fractional mineral interest subject to an NPRI will result automatically 
in the various fractional interest owners being responsible for paying an 
NPRI. 
In Carrizo Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Barrow-Shaver Res. Co.,
169
 a farmout 
agreement provided that the rights granted to a party may not be assigned, 
subleased or otherwise transferred in whole or in part, without the express 
written consent of the granting party. The court held that the contract 
allowed the granting party to withhold consent and that it had no obligation 
to act reasonably. In making its determination, the court found persuasive 
evidence showing that in the course of negotiations of the contract, 
                                                                                                                 
 168. 521 S.W. 3d 791 (Tex. 2017). 
 169. 516 S.W.3d 89, pet. filed, (Tex. App.—Tyler 2017). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
246 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 4 
  
 
qualifying language providing that consent could not be unreasonably 
withheld was deleted from the contract. 
The court in Greer v. Shook
170
 construed a 1927 deed that basically 
conveyed an undivided one-sixteenth interest in and to all oil, gas, and other 
minerals that may be produced, but then added that the grantee was 
purchasing one-half of the royalty, one-half of the minerals produced. The 
deed also provided that the sale covered and included one- half of all the oil 
and gas royalty due and to be paid under a then-existing lease. The issue on 
appeal was whether this language conveyed a floating one-half royalty 
interest or a fixed one-sixteenth royalty. The court applied the estate 
misconception doctrine to harmonize the conveyance’s inconsistent 
fractions, finding that the grantor used “1/16” as a shorthand for one-half of 
what he believed to be his remaining one-eighth mineral interest. The court 
therefore held that the deed unambiguously conveyed a floating one-half 
royalty, noting that there was nothing in the deed to indicate that grantor 
intended to convey a one-half royalty under the existing lease which would 
result in a substantially reduced one-sixteenth royalty under all future 
leases. 
Reed v. Maltsberger/Storey Ranch, LLC
171
 resolved contradictory 
language in a deed. A 1942 deed said it conveyed an undivided one-fourth 
interest in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals in and under and that 
may be produced from certain lands. The deed stated that the described 
lands were subject to an existing oil and gas lease. The deed limited certain 
rights normally given to mineral-interest owners. Although certain wording 
in the deed suggested the conveyance of a royalty interest, the court only 
looked at what was stated in the wording of the deed and did not otherwise 
consider the grantor’s intentions. Further, the court did not given 
controlling weight to the fact that the document was titled “Royalty Deed”. 
The court explained that the deed conveyed a mineral interest since it stated 
that it conveyed an interest in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals in 
and under the described lands. 
In BNSF Ry. Co. v. Chevron Midcontinent, L.P.,
172
 the court considered 
whether a deed that contained ambiguous language granted only an 
easement or a fee simple interest in the land. The granting clause of the 
deed purported to grant an easement by granting a right of way in a certain 
strip of land, while the habendum clause contemplated granting an interest 
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in fee simple. The court held that the overall intent of a grantor must be 
gleaned from within the four corners of the deed. Following the principle in 
Texas Electric Railway,
173
 the court held that the language in the granting 
clause controls. Because the overall language in the deed evidenced an 
intent to grant only an easement and the granting clause contemplated a 
right of way, while the habendum clause purported to grant a fee simple, 
the court upheld the decision that the deed granted to BNSF only an 
easement. Thus, BNSF had no rights to the mineral estate. The court did not 
reconcile the two grants by holding that there was a grant of an easement in 
perpetuity. 
In Samson Exploration, LLC v. T.S. Reed Props., Inc.,
174
 the court 
refused to reform the agreement based upon an assertion that the lessee 
mistakenly agreed to pay royalties twice by virtue of overlapping pooled 
units. A lessee of three wells maintained two pooled units. The second unit 
was maintained by the second and third wells. The lessee later amended the 
second unit to include only the second well and created a third unit to 
encompass the third well. During this process, however, the lessee 
mistakenly created the second and third units in a manner that caused the 
underlying rights to overlap and subjected the lessee to the duty to pay 
royalties on the wells twice—once to those in the second unit and once to 
those in the third unit. When the lessee failed to pay the appropriate amount 
of royalties, the royalty owners in the units brought suit to recover the 
unpaid royalties. Arguing defense of impossibility, the lessee asserted that it 
was impossible to cross-convey the same pooled lands, substances and 
depths twice at the same time. Rejecting this argument, the court noted that 
there was no impediment from enforcement of the royalty obligations 
against the lessee, even if there was no effective conveyance of title. The 
lessee additionally sought reimbursement from the second unit for any 
royalty obligation paid to it that was actually owed to those in the third unit. 
Rejecting this request, the court stated that the lessee must bear its 
contractual obligation to pay royalties out of its working interest rather than 
seeking reimbursement from owners of the second unit as the lessee’s 
economic consequences of its actions were of its own making.  
In Norhill Energy LLC v. McDaniel,
175
 an oil and gas lessee brought suit 
against its lessor alleging breach of contract and the equitable claim of 
money “had and received.” These actions arose out of lessor’s failure to 
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provide $50,000 to lessee under the lease contract which stipulated that the 
subject lease would be assigned back to the lessor at which time the lessor 
would pay lessee $50,000. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of 
lessor, lessee appealed and the court of appeals reversed and rendered. The 
appeals court overruled lessee’s breach of contract claim because, although 
lessee established the element of breach at trial, it did not demonstrate how 
it was entitled to $50,000 in damages for the breach. However, the court did 
uphold lessee’s claim for money had and received. Lessor argued that the 
claim for money had and received was barred because the express contract 
between the parties precluded the claim and the lessee had an adequate 
remedy at law. However, the court noted that the Texas Supreme Court has 
not ruled on whether an action for money had and received is barred when 
the money in dispute is part of a valid contract that would otherwise 
provide an adequate remedy at law. Although the court went on to note that 
equitable claims are generally barred when there is an express contract 
covering the issue, it also noted that the general rule is not absolute. The 
court concluded that the facts in this case did not preclude lessee’s claim for 
money had and received because it was not inconsistent with the express 
agreement.  
In Crystal River Oil & Gas, LLC v. Patton,
176
 the court determined 
whether the trial court erred when it limited “reworking operations,” under 
an oil and gas lease, to activities on “producing wells.” Crystal River owned 
and operated wells on the oil and gas lease in question. The oil wells 
produced about twenty barrels of salt water for each barrel of oil they 
produced, so Crystal River operated a disposal well on the lease to manage 
the salt water production. The disposal well broke down, and while Crystal 
River was repairing the well it shut in its oil wells for more than sixty days. 
Believing that the lapse in production terminated the lease, Patton obtained 
an oil and gas lease covering the same lands. Thereafter, Patton sued 
Crystal River to establish his title. Crystal River’s lease provided that, if 
production should cease after the primary term, the lease would not 
terminate if the lessee commenced additional drilling or reworking 
operations within sixty days thereafter. The case was submitted to the jury, 
and the jury was given the following questions: Did the Defendants fail to 
commence drilling or reworking activities on the producing wells in 
question within 60 days after the wells ceased to produce oil and gas? The 
jury answered yes, and Crystal River appealed. The court of appeals 
reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court erred in restricting 
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“reworking operations” to activities “on the producing wells”, as such 
restriction was not expressly so stated in the Crystal River lease. 
In BP America Production Co. v. Laddex, Ltd.,
177
 top lessee Laddex 
brought suit against BP arguing BP’s bottom lease had terminated for 
failure to produce in paying quantities. In turn, BP argued that Laddex’s top 
lease was void as it violated the Rule Against Perpetuities. Laddex’s top 
lease specified that it would commence on (1) the date when written 
releases of BP’s bottom lease were filed or (2) the date a judgment 
terminating BP’s lease became final and non-appealable. The trial court 
determined that the Rule did not void Laddex’s lease, and the jury found 
that BP’s lease terminated for failure to produce in paying quantities over a 
reasonable time period. The court of appeals affirmed that the Rule did not 
invalidate Laddex’s lease, but determined that the jury was improperly 
instructed on the production in paying quantities analysis. The Supreme 
Court affirmed. In so doing, the court determined that Laddex’s lease 
conveyed to it a partial alienation of the lessors’ possibility of reverter 
under BP’s bottom lease—an interest that had already vested. Turning to 
the jury instruction issue, the court determined that the instruction asking 
whether the well at issue produced in paying quantities during a specific 15-
month time period was error. The court noted that narrowing the question 
on paying production to any particular time period was arbitrary. Thus, 
although the parties were free to argue their views regarding what would be 
a reasonable time period, the charge to the jury may not instruct the jury as 
to the time period to consider. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the 
intermediate appellate court and remanded the matter for a new trial.  
In Hardin Simmons University v. Hunt Cimaron LP,
178
 the lessor sued 
the lessee, claiming the lease terminated at the conclusion of the primary 
term because the lessee failed to develop any new wells or convert any 
existing wells to producing wells during that term. Evidence showed that 
the lessee began reworking operations on ten existing wells prior to the end 
of the primary term. The trial court entered a take nothing judgment against 
the lessor. On appeal, the appellate court reviewed the lease contract, 
specifically the Pugh, retained acreage, reworking, and continuous 
development clauses. The court interpreted the reworking clause to mean 
the lease only continued with respect to the ten existing wells being 
reworked and the retained acreage associated with those wells. The court’s 
decision turned on the difference in language between the continuous 
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development and reworking provisions. The continuous development clause 
kept the lease in effect regarding all lands and all depths whereas the 
reworking clause only continued the lease in accordance to its terms. The 
court ruled that because of the language referring to the terms of the lease, 
the reworking clause incorporated the Pugh and retained acreage clauses. 
The result was the termination of the lease with respect to the land not 
producing or being reworked. However, the lease remained in effect as to 
the ten wells being reworked and 40 acres around each of those wells. 
In Westlake Ethylene Pipeline Corp. v. Railroad Commission of Texas,
179
 
the court ruled on the enforceability of the tariff of Westlake Ethylene 
Pipeline Corporation, a common carrier and the owner and operator of a 
pipeline that solely transports liquified ethylene and runs between Mont 
Belvieu and Longview, Texas. In 2013, Eastman Chemical Company filed 
a complaint with the Railroad Commission, asserting that Westlake’s tariff 
was discriminatory, and therefore unenforceable. The tariff canceled two 
services that were previously offered by Westlake—backhaul services and 
exchange services. To backhaul is to cause the flow of product in the 
opposite direction from the usual direction of flow. Exchange services refer 
to the transfer of custody of a specific quantity or volume of a fungible 
product (such as ethylene) from one location to another so that no physical 
movement of the product is necessary. Eastman claimed that these 
cancellations provided an unreasonable preference to Westlake Longview 
Corp., an affiliate of Westlake, because elimination of the backhaul and 
exchange services cut off access to the Mont Belvieu market and unduly 
required other shippers to conduct business with Westlake Longview Corp. 
The issue was initially brought before the Railroad Commission, which 
found that the tariff was unenforceable. Westlake challenged that ruling, 
and the district court ruled in favor of Eastman. The court of appeals 
affirmed the Railroad Commission’s decision, holding that discrimination 
includes not only disparate treatment of similarly situated shippers but also 
the granting of an undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to a 
particular shipper. Here, there was a reasonable basis for the Commission’s 
finding that the tariff was discriminatory. 
In ExxonMobil v. Lazy R Ranch,
180
 a landowner sought damages and 
injunctive relief to remedy a continuing nuisance caused by soil and 
groundwater contamination from an oil and gas lease. The Texas Supreme 
Court agreed with the trial court that claims concerning two of the four 
                                                                                                                 
 179. 506 S.W.3d 676, pet. filed, (Tex. App.—Austin 2016). 
 180. 511 S.W.3d 538 (Tex. 2017). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol4/iss2/2
2018]  Legal Developments in 2017 Affecting Oil and Gas 251 
 
 
contaminated sites were barred by the statute of limitations. As to the other 
two sites, active operations were still being conducted when suit was filed. 
Consequently, the court found the evidence conflicting as to when the 
contamination had occurred and reversed the trial court’s summary 
judgment ruling as to those two sites. The court reiterated that the 
“discovery rule” does not apply to delay the commencement of the 
limitations period when conditions on the ground are objectively verifiable. 
Additionally, the court affirmed Texas’ economic feasibility exception to 
the measure of damages for contamination of land. However, even though 
the court cited with approval prior cases holding that limitations is not a 
defense to abate a continuing nuisance, the court declined to address the 
plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief. The court found that Exxon Mobil 
failed to address the injunctive claims in its original summary judgment 
motion, and the plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief evolved over the 
course of the case and muddled the issue further. 
Lightning Oil Company v. Andarko E&P Onshore, LLC
181
 involved a 
claim against one mineral lessee by an adjoining mineral lessee for tortious 
interference with contract and trespass. Lightning sought an injunction and 
restraining order to prevent Anadarko from siting a well on the surface of 
Lightning’s lease and drilling through that tract to produce a well bottomed 
on the adjacent lease. The court held that the drilling from the adjacent 
lease could be enjoined or prevented by the lessee of the drill site tract. 
Such drilling would not constitute tortious interference with the contractual 
rights of the Plaintiff lessee. The court noted that that drilling of wells from 
one lease to an adjacent lease is surface use for accommodation doctrine 
purposes. The court further found that when land is leased for oil and gas 
purposes, the surface owner owns and controls the earth underground his 
surface and the mineral owner has the exclusive right to possess, use and 
appropriate oil and gas. The mineral estate is the “dominant estate” in that 
the lessee has the right to use the surface as is reasonably necessary to 
remove and produce the leased mineral. A trespass includes the 
unauthorized interference with the rights of the property holder as well as 
unauthorized interference with the physical property. However, the court 
noted that the right to drill, explore and produce the mineral does not 
include the right to possess the specific space where the minerals are 
located. A trespass as to minerals only occurs if there is an interference with 
the ability of the lessee to exercise its right. The loss of minerals by such 
drilling activity would be small and is outweighed by interests of the 
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industry and society to maximize oil and gas recovery. The court found that 
the surface owner’s action in allowing Anadarko to drill from the adjacent 
tract did not constitute a tortious interference. 
In Noble Energy, Inc. v. ConocoPhillips Co.,
182
 the court held that Noble 
assumed certain liability, when its predecessor purchased a lease from 
Alma Energy Corp., a debtor in bankruptcy. ConocoPhillips had assigned 
Alma Energy a lease (the Lease), which assignment was governed by an 
exchange agreement. Under the exchange agreement Alma Energy agreed 
to indemnify ConocoPhillips for all claims arising out of waste materials or 
hazardous substances arising under the Lease, among other properties. A 
few years later, Alma Energy declared bankruptcy. Noble’s predecessor in 
title acquired the Lease, which Alma Energy did not specifically reject 
during the bankruptcy proceedings. Thereafter, ConocoPhillips settled a 
$63 million claim related to the Lease. ConocoPhillips sought indemnity 
from Noble pursuant to the exchange agreement, which it claimed Noble 
had assumed. Noble contended that it never specifically assumed the 
exchange agreement. Noble also argued that the boilerplate language in the 
bankruptcy plan, which provided that “any Executory Contract or lease not 
referenced above shall be assumed and assigned,” did not reflect Noble’s 
intent to assume the exchange agreement. Nonetheless, the court found in 
favor of ConocoPhillips, stating that the language in the plan was sufficient 
to provide Noble’s predecessor with notice that the exchange contract was 
assumed. 
Crawford v. XTO Energy, Inc.
183
 centered on whether Texas Rule of 
Civil Procedure 39 required joinder of the lessor’s neighboring landowners 
as parties to the suit. The plaintiff-lessor claimed an interest in a narrow 
strip of land based on a 1964 mineral reservation. But XTO, the lessee’s 
successor, apportioned all royalties on the strip to other adjacent 
landowners under the common law strip-and-gore doctrine. The lessor sued 
XTO for royalties without joining the abutting landowners. The trial court 
dismissed the case because of the absence of the adjacent owners, reasoning 
that they were necessary parties under Rule 39. The court held this was an 
abuse of discretion. Rule 39 requires joinder of a party who claims an 
interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the 
disposition of the action in his absence may as a practical matter impair or 
impede his ability to protect that interest. While XTO claimed these 
surrounding landowners had such an interest under the common law strip-
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and-gore doctrine, the surrounding landowners themselves made no such 
claim. The court explained that Rule 39 does not require joinder of persons 
who potentially could claim an interest in the subject of the action; it only 
requires joinder of persons who actually claim such an interest. 
Accordingly, the surrounding landowners were not necessary parties under 
Rule 39. 
In Jarzombek v. Ramsey,
184
 the court determined that the “discovery 
rule” is not applicable in cases in which the terms of the deed differ from 
the terms in the associated real estate contract. The Jarzombeks owned the 
surface estate to two tracts of land. They owned 100% of the mineral 
interest to one tract and a one-sixteenth royalty interest to the second tract. 
In the real estate contract, Ramsey purchased the surface estate and one-half 
of the mineral and royalty interest then owned by the Jarzombeks for both 
tracts. The warranty deed conveyed both tracts to Ramsey, reserving an 
undivided one-thirty-second royalty interest to the two tracts for twenty 
years. Almost seven years later, the Jarzombeks sued for deed reformation, 
alleging the suit was timely because the discovery rule tolled the statute of 
limitations. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's order of summary 
judgment on this issue, holding that the deed unambiguously reserved only 
a one-thirtysecond interest in both tracts. Because this fact was evident on 
the face of the deed, the Jarzombeks had actual knowledge of what the deed 
included as of the date the deed was signed. Therefore, the statute of 
limitations began to run upon execution of the deed and the discovery rule 
did not apply. 
In FLST, Ltd. v. Explorer Pipeline Co.,
185
 the court declined to determine 
for purposes of the “discovery rule” whether plaintiffs were reasonably 
diligent in their investigation of certain property that they had purchased. 
Plaintiffs filed suit against defendant for damages resulting from a 
reduction in the subsequent sale price of plaintiffs’ property that was due to 
defendant’s pipeline that ran underneath plaintiffs’ property. Defendant 
argued that plaintiffs were on constructive notice of the pipeline before 
purchasing the property and thus should not be afforded the benefit of the 
discovery rule because, among other pieces of evidence, gas pipeline 
markers were present and visible on the property when plaintiffs purchased 
it. Although plaintiffs were aware of the gas pipeline markers, they 
provided at least some evidence that contradicted the fact that a pipeline ran 
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beneath plaintiffs’ property. That is, the easement allowing the pipeline to 
run beneath the property had been amended by a prior owner to purportedly 
relocate the easement off the property. In fact, the pipeline was never 
actually relocated. The court held that it could not, as a matter of law, 
decide whether plaintiffs were reasonably diligent for purposes of the 
discovery rule because defendant did not establish that plaintiffs’ could not 
rely on the contradicting evidence.  
In Cabot Oil & Gas Corporation v. Newfield Exploration Mid-Continent 
Inc.,
186
 the court highlighted the potential pitfall of a vaguely worded 
reservation. Cabot purported to reserve an interest in a mineral lease in an 
assignment executed by Cabot. Newfield was the operator of the lease and 
argued that the Texas statute of frauds voided the portion of the reservation 
pertaining to “the 160 acre proration unit surrounding said well” due to an 
inability to accurately identify the acreage. The court agreed and held that 
such a description is insufficient because such language does not identify 
with reasonable certainty the acres that are to be included in the reservation. 
The court emphasized that a proration unit relating to the well had yet to be 
designated, and no particular geographic proration unit was named in the 
assignment or identified in any writing to which the assignment alluded. 
The court went on to explain that merely identifying the property as some 
specific quantum of acreage surrounding a well does not meet the demands 
of the statute of frauds and thus held the reservation void. Cabot also raised 
judicial and quasi estoppel arguments. In rejecting those arguments, the 
court explained that no contractual right existed for Cabot to enforce by 
barring Newfield from questioning its existence through estoppel. The court 
reiterated the rule that estoppel cannot be used to create a contract or supply 
essential terms of a contract. 
In Texas Outfitters Ltd., LLC v. Nicholson,
187
 the court reaffirmed the 
rule that an executive owner can breach its duty of good faith and fair 
dealing by refusing to lease either arbitrarily or when “motivated by self 
interest to the non-executive’s detriment.”188 After purchasing both surface 
rights and executive mineral rights from the Carter family, Texas Outfitters 
received two lease offers for the mineral rights. It declined both offers, 
reasoning that it wanted to protect its surface level hunting business. The 
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court determined that the record contained sufficient evidence to establish a 
breach. First, the owner of Texas Outfitters stated that there would be no 
lease despite purchasing the Carters’ executive rights with the purpose of 
further developing the mineral estate. Second, Texas Outfitters proposed to 
resell the surface and mineral rights to the Carters at an unfavorable price. 
Third, Texas Outfitters proposed restrictive covenants that would 
effectively preclude a mineral lease. Finally, the court rejected Texas 
Outfitters’ contention that it was holding out for a better offer because none 
of the surrounding landowners had received an offer better than that made 
to Texas Outfitters. 
In Mzyk v. Murphy Exploration & Prod. Co.–USA,189 the court explained 
the limits of the “reasonably prudent operator” standard with respect to 
offset well obligations. Under the lease, if a neighboring operator drilled a 
well within 467 feet of the lease line, the lessee agreed to drill such offset 
well or wells on the lease as a reasonably prudent operator would drill 
under the same or similar circumstances. A number of wells were drilled 
adjacent to the lessor’s property within 467 feet. The lessee decided that 
drilling on the lease would not be profitable and that a reasonably prudent 
operator would not have drilled the lease. The lessor sued for breach of the 
offset-well provision, arguing the provision established how the lessee was 
to drill an offset well, not whether to drill at all. Affirming summary 
judgment for the lessee, the court explained that the lease provision 
expressly adopted the “reasonably prudent operator” standard, which 
generally applies to the lessee’s determination of whether to drill an offset 
well at all, not just to how the lessee would drill an offset well, as the lessor 
argued. Because the lessor offered no evidence that a reasonably prudent 
operator would have drilled an offset well, the court affirmed summary 
judgment for the lessee. 
XII. West Virginia 
A. Legislative Developments 
The West Virginia Legislature passed the West Virginia Safer 
Workplaces Act, H.B. 2857,
190
 which expands the circumstances under 
which employers may conduct drug and alcohol testing. Previously, 
employees could be tested under two circumstances: (1) if a reasonable 
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suspicion existed to justify the test; or (2) if the employee held a safety 
sensitive position. Now, drug and/or alcohol testing may be performed for a 
variety of reasons (e.g., deterrence of illicit drug use, investigating 
accidents in the workplace or possible individual employee impairment). 
Under the new law, testing may even occur where there are no indications 
of individual, job-related impairment. Thus, the new law greatly expands an 
employer’s ability to test employees. 
The West Virginia Legislature passed H.B. 2811,
191
 which amends the 
Abovegound Storage Tank Act (ASTA) by exempting tanks used to store 
brine and other gas industry waste liquids. The bill exempts an estimated 
2,300 tanks. The exemption only applies to tanks located inside the “zone 
of peripheral concern,” which is an area between 5 and 10 hours upstream 
of a drinking water intake. Tanks are exempted that have a capacity of 210 
barrels, which is 8,850 gallons, and contain brine water or other fluids 
produced in connection with hydrocarbon production activities. These tanks 
will have to register with the West Virginia Department of Environmental 
Protection but are not covered under other parts of the ASTA. 
The West Virginia Legislature passed S.B. 505,
192
 which provides a five-
year reclamation period following completion of well pads for horizontal 
wells.  
B. Judicial Developments 
In Leggett v EQT Production Company
193
, the court found that the use of 
the language “at the wellhead” in West Virginia’s Flat Rate Royalty Statute 
allows the use of the "net back" method to calculate royalties. In doing so, 
the court found that the Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Resources, 
L.L.C. case did not apply or control. The court was tasked with determining 
whether the holding in Tawney, which did not allow post-production 
expense deductions when calculating royalty, applied when royalties are 
paid on old, flat rate leases converted to a one-eighth royalty by application 
of Flat Rate Royalty Statute. The statute provides that royalties are to be 
paid “at the wellhead.” Tawney held that “at the wellhead” language in a 
lease was ambiguous, and deductions could not be taken unless expressly 
authorized in the lease in detail as to the type and method of calculation. In 
Leggett, the court held that the rules of contract construction used to decide 
Tawney did not apply when interpreting a statute. The ruling in this case 
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indicated the court’s potential willingness to reconsider Tawney, which 
would impact royalty calculations for West Virginia production. 
In Bowyer v. Wyckoff,
194
 the court held that a party seeking a partition of 
property by allotment or by sale under W. Va. Code § 37-4-3 must strictly 
follow the prerequisites in the statute. In Bowyer, a party was seeking to 
partition the surface of property in kind or by sale. A counterclaim was 
brought, however, seeking to partition both the surface and the mineral 
interests either though by allotment or by sale, allegedly because the party 
wanted to develop the shallow natural gas under the property. The court 
rejected partition by sale of the surface and mineral interests because the 
challenging party had not otherwise proven entitlement to partition by sale 
under §37-4-3. The Court maintained the following rationale for rejecting 
sale by partition: 
The forced sale of oil and gas minerals precludes the owner of 
the benefit of lease consideration and the prospect of production 
proceeds, which represent the primary and perhaps the exclusive 
value which such ownership vests. Therefore, the public interest 
will not be promoted by sale. 
Under this rationale, any partition for sale or by allotment under §37-4-3 
can be forestalled by a single interest holder who does not wish to sell his 
or her interest—which undercuts the entire purpose of the partition statute 
and results in a “forced” sale of a person’s property interest, whether the 
partition be by sale or by allotment. The Court’s implicit acceptance of the 
notion that any “forced sale of oil and gas interests” precludes partition is 
likely to hamper efforts of oil and natural gas producers to use the partition 
statute to develop minerals. 
C. Administrative Developments 
The WVDEP issued a Final Interpretive Rule, 33 CSR 1A, "Disposal of 
Completion or Production Waste." One amendment involved modifying the 
proposed term "Completion Waste" to instead be termed as "Completion 
and Production Waste." The change of the term to include the words 
"Production Waste" supports landfills in accepting production waste 
streams in addition to the completion waste streams. Further, Section 3.1 
was amended to clarify that the permittee should obtain a minor permit 
modification prior to accepting or disposing of completion waste in the 
landfill. WDVEP has changed the language in subsection 3.3 to clarify the 
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radiation monitoring requirements that apply are from subsection 3.5 of the 
proposed rule. Subdivisions 3.4.a and 3.4.b were combined to clarify the 
waste profiling requirements needed to obtain a minor permit modification. 
Subdivision 3.4.c was amended to ensure that if the combined concentration 
in the waste was equal to fifty picocuries per gram (50pCi/gr.), the facility 
could also accept the waste for disposal.  
XIII. Wyoming 
A. Legislative Developments 
The legislature addressed two issues related to Wyoming’s ad 
valorem/gross products tax on oil and gas and other mineral production. 
First, the legislature required the Wyoming Department of Revenue to 
conduct a study on a potential discounted cash flow valuation method for 
ad valorem production taxes.
195
 Second, the legislature clarified that when a 
producer properly withholds royalties to pay taxes, fees, or penalties on 
behalf of a royalty or overriding royalty owner, ad valorem tax liens will 
not attach to the property of the royalty or overriding royalty owner.
196
 
The legislature authorized the Governor to use Wyoming’s Federal 
Natural Resource Policy Account to facilitate mineral development 
permitting and to address related issues.
197
 
Finally, the legislature extended the sunset or expiration date of 
Wyoming’s sales and use tax exemption on sales or leases of machinery 
used in the state for manufacturing (including certain oil refining 
operations) from December 31, 2017 to December 31, 2027.
198
  
B. Judicial Developments 
In Questar Exploration & Production v. Rocky Mountain Resources,
199
 
the Wyoming Supreme Court distinguished an earlier opinion, Ultra 
Resources v. Hartman,
200
 and determined an oil and gas lease did not 
constitute a renewal, substitute, or new lease, when compared to earlier 
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leases for similar areas. As such, royalty interests established in the older 
leases did not transfer to the newer lease.
201
 
Anadarko Land Corp. v. Family Tree Corp.
202
 involved complicated and 
competing chains of title to oil and gas interests. One chain of title 
originated from disputed production taxes assessed by a Wyoming county 
in 1911. While the court determined the production taxes were improperly 
assessed, it concluded the county’s action was not a clear jurisdictional 
error. The resulting tax sale and deed were merely voidable and because the 
assessments were not challenged within the statutory limitations period, the 
court concluded deeds based on the assessment and tax sale were valid.  
In Wyoming v. Zinke,
203
 the court set aside the Bureau of Land 
Management’s (BLM) March 2015 hydraulic fracturing regulation.204 
Supporters of the regulation appealed the court’s decision to the Tenth 
Circuit. However, before the appeal was decided, the BLM asked the Tenth 
Circuit to hold the case in abeyance based on Executive Orders issued by 
the President.
205
 On September 21, 2017, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the 
appeals as prudentially unripe.
206
  
Bear Peak Resources, LLC v. Peak Powder River Resources, LLC,
207
 
concerned a mineral acquisition and development agreement between two 
parties. The agreement applied to a specific Area of Mutual Interest (AMI). 
When one of the parties acquired mineral interests without compensating 
the other party, that second party sued for breach of contract, breach of 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, accounting, breach of 
fiduciary duty, negligent misrepresentation and unjust enrichment. A state 
district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant and 
dismissed the lawsuit. On appeal, the court affirmed the summary judgment 
order on the breach of implied covenant, accounting and breach of fiduciary 
duty claims. However, the court reversed the district court’s decision on the 
interpretation and status of the AMI agreement, and remanded to the district 
court with instructions to reconsider those issues. 
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C. Administrative Developments 
In early 2017, the Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission 
revised its rules to set specific limits for natural gas flaring and venting.
208
 
The new rules allow emergency flaring and venting, and recognize flaring 
and venting may occur during well purging, evaluation, or production 
tests.
209
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